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THE CENTRAL CLAIMING RENAISSANCE
Andres Sawickit
The Supreme Court has recently reinvigorated the law of
patentable subject matter. But beneath the headlines pro-
claiming the return of limits to patent eligibility, a more
profound shift has taken place: central claiming is reborn.
The Court's eligibility cases are significant outliers com-
pared to today's run-of-the-mill patent law because claim lan-
guage plays little role in their analyses. In our modern
peripheral claiming system, the claim language is the near-
exclusive guide to the patent's boundaries. But in its earliest
days, our patent system pursued a central claiming approach,
in which the inventor's actual work determined the patent's
scope. The Court's eligibility cases focus on the inventor's
actual contribution to the field, precisely as a central claiming
inquiry would. And they can be better understood once this
return to central claiming is revealed.
Indeed, the shift to central claiming points the way toward
a principled approach to eligibility. The eligibility requirement
aims to prevent patents from covering certain kinds of prohib-
ited subject matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas. But every invention, at some level of abstrac-
tion, applies ineligible subject matter. In a peripheral claiming
system, this levels-of-abstraction problem could lead courts to
simply deem all claims eligible (as occurred for nearly thirty
years) or all claims ineligible (as some fear will happen today).
Central claiming offers a solution by focusing on what the
inventor added to the storehouse of knowledge. It is that con-
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tribution, rather than some abstraction from the claim lan-
guage, that guides the eligibility analysis.
There are several additional payoffs to uncovering the
Court's return to central claiming. It helps make sense of the
Court's eligibility jurisprudence, revealing two distinct threads
in the cases-one focusing on ineligible contributions and an-
other on implausible contributions-with distinct (though un-
easy) normative foundations. More robust use of central
claiming might also improve other areas of patent law. As a
proof of concept, I show that it could provide a better approach
to the exhaustion trigger, improve the law of divided infringe-
ment, and rehabilitate the written description requirement.
These examples illustrate the potential of the central claiming
renaissance.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recently reinvigorated the long-
dormant law of patentable subject matter. In a quartet of
cases-Bilski v. Kappos,1 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prome-
theus Laboratories, Inc.,2 Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc.,3 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Interna-
tional4 -the Court transformed what had been a dead letter
into the primary test of a patent's validity.5 These cases have
attracted voluminous attention.6 But existing scholarship has
missed perhaps the most important implication of the Court's
efforts: central claiming is reborn.
The consensus view is that the Court's eligibility jurispru-
dence is impenetrable.7 Most scholars contend that the cases
are incoherent because of underlying conflicts about the nor-
mative goals of patentable subject matter or unresolved empiri-
cal questions about the effects of patents in particular
industries. The premise is that if we could just agree on an
underlying normative theory, or detect the actual impacts of
patents, we would have a comprehensible eligibility doctrine.8
1 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
2 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
3 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
4 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
5 See Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated
Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1797-99
(2014). These cases focus on utility patents, setting design patents aside for the
moment, and this Article follows suit.
6 See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution in Induced
Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (2016) (noting that of
the Court's past decade's worth of patent cases, its pronouncements on eligibility
have "garnered [the] most attention and commentary"). For an introduction to the
literature, see Symposium, Cracking the Code: Ongoing Section 101 Patentability
Concerns in Biotechnology and Computer Software, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1751
(2014); Symposium, The Future of Patents: Bilski and Beyond, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1245 (2011); Symposium, The Meaning of Myriad, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 973
(2015).
7 See, e.g., John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A
Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1765, 1770 (2014) ("Since the Supreme Court issued its Bilski decision in
2010, the law of subject-matter eligibility has plunged into a seemingly ever
widening maelstrom of uncertainty.").
8 See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life
After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1328 (2011) ("[I]n order to appropriately apply
the [patentable subject matter] exceptions, one must first understand their theory
and the particular policy problem they are addressing."); see also Tun-Jen Chi-
ang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858,
1873-85 (2014) (arguing that doctrinal incoherence in patentable subject matter
stems from a refusal to recognize the noneconomic normative aims of patentable
subject matter rules); John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 617-20 (2009) (arguing that uncertainty
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Meanwhile, a minority of commentators view the problem
as lying primarily in the Court's explicit pronouncements re-
garding the contours of patentable subject matter doctrine.9
This minority is correct, up to a point. The problem is doctri-
nal, and it demands a doctrinal solution. But the problem lies
not in patentable subject matter itself.
Instead, the problem lies in how the Court has identified
the invention to which the patentable subject matter require-
ment applies. 10 Modem patent law is dominated by peripheral
claiming, which defines the invention according to the lan-
guage in the patent's claims." The patentee's rights extend as
far as the language a lawyer used to draft those claims, almost
regarding "the extent to which the potentially positive effects of patents are out-
weighed by their potential negative effects" has created "instability" in patentable
subject matter law); Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope,
19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 47, 72 (2012) (arguing that if patent law
"exists to further utilitarian goals," then "the central inquiry should be what scope
of patent protection (if any) is required to promote the creation and development of
the relevant technology"); Amy L. Landers, Patentable Subject Matter as a Policy
Driver, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 505, 544-46 (2015) (arguing that considering "creative,
economic, and social factors in making the patentability determination" will in-
crease certainty in patentable subject matter jurisprudence). See generally
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011) (providing a historical, utilitarian, and normative founda-
tion for eligibility).
9 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice
Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 647, 650 (2015) ("The major
obstacle to consistency and predictability in the field is the incoherence of the
Supreme Court's opinions."); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism
and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1308 (2011) (suggesting that the solution to incoherent eligi-
bility doctrine "requires courts to integrate the constitutional and jurisprudential
traditions surrounding patentable subject matter with statutory construction
principles and forthright recognition of the challenges of applying historic doc-
trines to unforeseeable technological developments").
10 The closest existing analysis is Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 Nw.
U. L. REV. CoLLOQUY 82 (2012). Chao argues that Mayo imperfectly adopted a
point of novelty approach, emphasizing the claim elements that distinguish the
claimed invention from the prior art. Id. at 91-94. Although I agree that this is
the most plausible interpretation of Step Two, it does not accurately capture the
Court's approach at Step One, and accordingly cannot illuminate the Court's
patentable subject matter jurisprudence more generally, the way a central claim-
ing understanding can. See infra text accompanying notes 110-60.
11 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking
Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1744 (2009) ("In modern
American patent doctrine, we define what the patentee owns not by what she
actually built or disclosed, but by what she claimed."); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claim-
ing Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 731-35 (2009).
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no matter what the inventor actually did to merit the patent in
the first place.12
But the Court's eligibility jurisprudence does not use pat-
ent law's standard peripheral claiming methodology; instead, it
starts with a central claiming perspective. Central claiming
approaches, which prevailed at the dawn of the patent system
but have been in retreat for well over a century, measure the
scope of the patent by the contribution the inventor made to
the art.13 While the claim language plays some role in the
central claiming analysis, the description of the invention in
the patent's specification plays a much larger one. And it is the
specification's thorough explanation of what the inventor did-
not just the language used in the claims at the end of the
patent-that is the focus of the patentable subject matter
inquiry.
The Court's cases have coalesced around a two-step frame-
work for assessing eligibility.1' Step One asks whether the
claim is "directed to" one of three categories of ineligible subject
matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.15 If so, then Step Two demands that the claim include
"an inventive concept," ensuring that it "amounts to signifi-
cantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself."' 6
Viewing these cases through a central claiming lens reveals
that the implicit object of the Step One analysis is the inven-
tor's contribution. And this is fundamentally a central claim-
ing inquiry-the Court determines whether the eligibility
requirement is satisfied by reviewing the specification for an
understanding of the inventor's contribution to the art.
12 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1749; Fromer, supra note 11, at
734-35. Note that in this context, "what the inventor actually did" may be more
precisely understood as "what the inventor said she actually did, as described in
the specification." Thus, inventors may include prophetic examples in their speci-
fications describing what would happen were their inventions actually practiced,
even if they themselves didn't practice them. See Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074,
1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987). More generally, there are thorny questions regarding
courts' ability to rely on evidence outside the patent in understanding just what it
is that the inventor claims. See infra text accompanying notes 228-29. The point
here is simply that the goal of the modem peripheral claiming regime is to under-
stand how a person of ordinary skill would understand the words of the claims,
rather than to understand what the inventor (asserts she) has added to the field.
13 See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1, 15 (2014).
14 This framework was initially developed in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) and subsequently formalized in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
15 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
16 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Recognizing this turn to central claiming has several
payoffs. It improves our understanding of existing law and
offers new opportunities for solving old problems. I focus first
on the doctrinal and normative implications for patentable
subject matter itself because this is where central claiming has
had its most immediate influence.
The central claiming insight allows us to distinguish two
doctrinal threads in the Court's jurisprudence, with distinct
normative foundations. The first thread, exemplified by Alice
and BiLski, comprises scenarios in which the inventor cannot
provide a plausible description of the contribution she made to
the art.' 7 This implausible-contributions thread is analogous
to civil procedure's Twiqbal plausibility pleading standard.
Twiqbal asks judges for a commonsense assessment of
whether the allegations in a complaint are sufficiently plausible
to merit the expense of discovery; 1 8 in much the same way, the
Alice and Bilskit thread asks judges for a commonsense assess-
ment of whether the inventor's description of her contribution
to the art is sufficiently plausible to merit the expense of mea-
suring its compliance with more demanding validity doctrines.
This approach holds some promise.' 9 It could cheaply
weed out claims that are, on their face, transparent attempts to
obtain patent rights to things that the putative inventor did not
herself invent. Nevertheless, the normative case for this thread
is uneasy because judges may prove incapable of making
cheap and accurate assessments of plausibility over the wide
range of technological fields in which inventors seek patents.
The second thread, exemplified by Mayo itself, comprises
scenarios in which the inventor's contribution included the
identification of ineligible subject matter.2 0 The intuition driv-
ing this thread is that, when someone else previously disclosed
the ineligible subject matter, patent law's newness rules-nov-
elty and non-obviousness-will prevent a patent from providing
practical exclusivity over the ineligible subject matter itself.
Einstein's work would raise probably insurmountable novelty
and non-obviousness bars to an inventor seeking a patent to-
day that would provide her exclusivity over E = mc 2 .
Conversely, when the inventor herself was the first to dis-
close the ineligible subject matter, the only effective barrier will
17 See infra subpart III.A.
18 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007).
19 See ifra section III.A.2.
20 See infra subpart III.B.
650 [Vol. 103:645
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be the patentable subject matter requirement itself. This is
what it means for a patent to be "directed to" ineligible subject
matter in the way that Step One cares about. 2 1 Because in
these scenarios, novelty and non-obviousness cannot prevent
the patent's scope from including things we want to keep out of
the patent system, we need the increased scrutiny that Step
Two provides.
The normative case for this thread parallels the first. 2 2
That implausible-contributions thread aims to use eligibility to
reject patents when it is the cheapest way to eliminate an un-
desirable patent. This ineligible-contributions thread aims to
use novelty and non-obviousness to reject patents when those
are the doctrines that can most easily do the work, but apply
increased patentable subject matter scrutiny to patents for
which novelty and non-obviousness will be ineffective bars.
This normative justification is, however, also uneasy. Paten-
tees may draft specifications that evade increased eligibility
scrutiny, and it is unclear whether other rules-especially the
enablement doctrine-will adequately police such evasion.
Importantly, central claiming can, and peripheral claiming
cannot, provide information about the relative efficacy of differ-
ent doctrines in preventing a patentee from obtaining exclusiv-
ity over ineligible subject matter.2 3 Every invention, at some
level of abstraction, applies a law of nature, natural phenome-
non, or abstract idea.24 Because the claim language does not
describe the relationship between the invention and the ineligi-
ble subject matter it applies, we have to abstract away from the
claim itself to discern that relationship. But there is no way to
know how far we must abstract away. Peripheral claiming
poses a challenging, and perhaps insurmountable, levels-of-
abstraction problem for eligibility doctrine.
Until Bilski, this problem had been solved by applying an
underinclusive rule: courts held that essentially no claim
raised eligibility concerns. 25 A reinvigorated eligibility doctrine
that continued to rely on peripheral claiming would run into an
overinclusiveness problem. Because every claim is an applica-
21 See infra section III.B.1.
22 See infra section III.B.2.
23 See infra subpart II.C.
24 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71
(2012).
25 See Holman, supra note 5, at 1802-05 (describing how the Court's deci-
sions in the early 1980s "laid the groundwork for a subsequent dramatic expan-
sion in the recognized scope of patent-eligible subject matter").
2018]1 651
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tion of ineligible subject matter, every claim would be at risk of
ineligibility.
The Court's turn to central claiming is therefore a sensi-
ble-perhaps even necessary-corollary to its resuscitation of
patentable subject matter restrictions. Central claiming pro-
vides a standards-like assessment of the scope of the patent,
allowing courts to engage in more nuanced evaluations of the
inventor's contribution.2 6 This move can therefore be seen as
another example of the evolution of rules into standards as a
predictable problem associated with a rule-underinclusive-
ness in this case-makes its continued application intolera-
ble.2 7 From this perspective, we should expect that this turn to
a standard will ultimately give way to a return to rules as
courts seek shortcuts that allow them to economize on the
decision costs associated with standards.
The Court's reliance on central claiming for eligibility pur-
poses could also be the start of a radical reorientation of the
patent system. So in addition to my more thorough analysis of
the existing law of patentable subject matter, I also provide
three illustrations of the potential for more widespread applica-
tion of central claiming. First, the trigger for patent exhaustion
has already shifted away from peripheral claiming; moving fur-
ther along that path towards central claiming could render
exhaustion a more effective tool to prevent opportunistic paten-
tees from stretching patent law beyond its boundaries. 28 Sec-
ond, the Court has expressed interest in revisiting existing law
on divided infringement, and I sketch out how a central claim-
ing approach might more sensibly deal with that problem.2 9
Finally, the long-criticized written description doctrine-a re-
dundant requirement in a peripheral claiming system-can be
rehabilitated as part of a more general turn toward central
claiming.3 0
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I first describes the
differences between central and peripheral claiming. It then
identifies problems in the Court's recent reinvigoration of the
26 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1777-83 (analogizing the choice
between peripheral and central claiming to the more general choice between rules
and standards).
27 See id. at 1779-81; Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REv. 577, 580-90 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCIA L.
REV. 379, 428-29 (1985) (explaining how rules evolve into standards, and stan-
dards subsequently evolve into rules).
28 See infra subpart IV.A.
29 See infra subpart IV.B.
30 See infra subpart IV.C.
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patentable subject matter requirement. Part II demonstrates
that a central claiming analysis is at the heart of the Court's
jurisprudence in this area and provides the normative case for
the Court's move. Part III then uses a central claiming lens to
clarify otherwise confusing aspects of patentable subject mat-
ter. Part IV illustrates the promise that central claiming holds
for other difficult challenges in the patent system. Part V
concludes.
I
THE SEARCH FOR ELIGIBLE INVENTIONS
This Part sets the stage for the Article's core contribution. I
first describe the differences between peripheral and central
claiming, and explain what is at stake in the choice between
them. I then recount the recent history of patentable subject
matter law, and introduce some of its problems. Readers famil-
iar with both claiming methodology and the current state of
patentable subject matter law may profitably skip ahead to
Part II.
A. Two Approaches to the Invention
1. Peripheral Versus Central Claiming
Modem patents include both a specification and a set of
claims.3 1 The specification is a description in words and draw-
ings of what the invention is, how it works, what problems it
aims to solve, and what distinguishes it from what came
before. 32 The claims are found at the end of the patent docu-
ment; each one is a sentence-long articulation of precisely what
31 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (requiring "a written description of the inven-
tion"); 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (providing that the "specification shall conclude
with one or more claims"). Technically, the claims are part of the specification,
but the term "specification" is often used to refer to the portion describing the
invention in words and drawings, rather than the portion setting forth the legal
boundaries. See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120,
2125 (2014) (distinguishing between "the written specification" and the "separate
section known as the 'claim'"); General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle
mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (similar). I follow this common prac-
tice of using the term "specification" to refer to the narrative description of the
invention as distinguished from the claims.
32 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.71 (2013); see also Christina Bohan-
nan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L.
REv. 905, 936 (2010) ("The written description in a patent typically describes the
history of the art prior to this patent, the problems that the patent addresses, and
the overall nature of the invention . . . .").
2018] 653
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it is that the inventor wants to prevent others from making,
using, or selling.3 3
In the case of a patent on a machine, for example, the
specification would explain the kinds of things the machine
could do, how to build it, and what makes it different from
preexisting machines. Each claim would then describe the va-
rious parts of the machine and how they interact. But because
it would do the patentee no good if the protected invention were
limited to a particular specific version of the machine, the
claims usually describe the invention at a fairly high level of
abstraction. As a result, claim language transforms nails and
screws into "fasteners"; laces and Velcro become "means for
adjusting fit"; and a projector turns into "image generating
means configured for generating an image presentable to the
user on the display."34
The patent system needs some method for making sense of
the claims and specification. For at least the past several de-
cades, and perhaps for the past century or so, the dominant
method has been what is called peripheral claiming.3 5 In a
peripheral claiming approach, a court uses the claim language
to set an outer limit to the patent's scope. The inventor's rights
extend to everything that falls inside that outer boundary; any-
thing outside is beyond the inventor's reach.36
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012); Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129-30 (requiring
that claims "inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with
reasonable certainty"); 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.06 (2016)
(describing single-sentence format for claims).
34 U.S. Patent No. 9,195,067 B1 col. 18, 11. 1-2 (filed Sept. 28, 2012).
35 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1748 (setting the 1870s as the date
when patent law adopted peripheral claiming): Fromer, supra note 11, at 734-75
(concluding that "the requirement of peripheral claiming [today] looks much as it
did in 1870"). I follow the common usage of "peripheral claiming" to describe the
Federal Circuit's current approach to claim interpretation methodology, in which
the patent's scope includes everything within the boundaries set by the claim
language; I do so to maintain consistency with the most widespread understand-
ing of that label, even though the Federal Circuit's current approach might more
accurately be viewed as a literalistic twist on traditional peripheral claiming ap-
proaches that prevailed until the Federal Circuit's cases in the 1990s. See John
F. Duffy, Counterproductive Notice in Literalistic Versus Peripheral Claiming, 96
B.U. L. REV. 1197, 1201-10 (2016).
36 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1744 (describing peripheral claiming
as a system in which "patent claims . .. defin[e] the outer boundaries ofa 'prop-
erty' right conferred on the patentee"); Fromer, supra note 11, at 734 (explaining
that in a peripheral claiming system, "[validity and infringement [are] measured
by construing the claim's bounds and then determining whether particular em-
bodiments fell within those bounds"). The "everything" there is actually contro-
versial. See Duffy, supra note 35, at 1201-04 (contending that peripheral
claiming does not require that the patentee's rights extend to everything that falls
within the claim's scope, but only that the claim set the furthest possible limit).
654
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Importantly, peripheral claiming at least downplays and
perhaps even ignores what the inventor actually accomplished.
The scope of the patentee's rights is defined simply by the
words used in the claims.37 And so, in a system dominated by
peripheral claiming, disputes about patent rights frequently
devolve into semantic disputes about the words in the claims,
rather than technical disputes about the inventor's work.38 In
Judge Rich's famous phrase: "the name of the game is the
claim."39
For an example of the modern peripheral claiming ap-
proach, consider Liebel-Flarsheima Co. v. Medrad, Inc.40 The
patent there described a powered fluid injector, which is a med-
ical device used to inject patients with fluids. 4 1 The question
was whether the invention included something called a pres-
sure jacket. Although the claims did not explicitly mention this
feature, the specification described the device as including a
pressure jacket, which prevented the syringe from breaking
during high-pressure fluid injection. 42 The claims said one
thing-there is no pressure jacket-and the specification said
another-there is a pressure jacket. Because the Federal Cir-
cuit understood the invention to be whatever the claim said it
was, rather than what the specification described as the inven-
tor's actual contribution, the court concluded that the inven-
tion did not include a pressure jacket.4 3
Perhaps it seems odd to conclude that the inventor's rights
encompassed a version of the invention that the inventor her-
self explained would break. And the claim was ultimately in-
validated precisely because it captured a version of the
invention that would not work.44 But this is just what a pe-
37 See Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2011)
("Because the words of the claim, not what the patentee actually built, determines
both whether the patent is valid and whether a defendant has infringed it, claim
language has come to have talismanic significance in patent law.").
38 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996)
(analogizing the task of construing a patent's reach to the task of interpreting
other legal documents like deeds and contracts); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. San-
doz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (describing the possibility that in construing
claim meaning, a court might have to "resolve[ I a dispute between experts and
make[ I a factual finding that, in general, a certain term of art had a particular
meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention").
39 Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
40 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
41 Id. at 900-01.
42 Without a pressure jacket, the syringe would not be able to withstand the
high pressure it would be exposed to during injection process. Id.
43 Id. at 903.
44 Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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ripheral claiming approach demands: the scope of the paten-
tee's rights is defined by the language of the claim, rather than
a pragmatic assessment of what the inventor did.
Although peripheral claiming is the predominant approach
in our modern patent system, we did not always rely on it. To
the contrary, the earliest American patents did not have claims
at all. 4 5 And even once claims became common, the patent
system did not use them as the near exclusive basis for deter-
mining what the patent covered.4 6
Instead, central claiming dominated. In this regime, rather
than begin and (pretty much) end with the claim language,
courts used both the specification and the claims to situate the
inventor's work in the context of the technological field to un-
derstand just what it is that the inventor contributed. 47 The
scope of protection was then calibrated to the inventor's contri-
bution. If the inventor made a major advance over what was
known at the time, the scope of protection expanded from the
language of the claims to cover many variations; if the inventor
made a trivial contribution, then the scope of protection con-
tracted, perhaps so much that even embodiments falling within
the literal words of the claims did not fall within the patentee's
right to exclude. 48
For a classic example of central claiming, consider Winans
v. Deniead.4 9 The patent there covered a design for a coal car.
45 For a thorough discussion of the historical evolution of claiming practices,
see Anderson & Menell, supra note 13, at 8-2 1.
46 Although claims became a required part of the patent document in 1836,
see Patent Act of 1836, sec. 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1952), courts continued
to use a central claiming approach to ascertaining the patentee's rights, see
Fromer, supra note 11, at 732-33. The rise of peripheral claiming is usually
traced to the 1870 amendment to the patent statute demanding that a patent
"particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination
which he claims as his invention or discovery." Act of July 8, 1870, sec. 26, 16
Stat. 198, 201; see Union Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 U.S. 332, 337 (1879);
Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 569-71 (1876); Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at
1766-71; Fromer, supra note 11, at 734-35.
47 Anderson & Menell, supra note 13, at 15 ("During the period when central
claiming predominated . . . courts used claims as well as the specification to
ascertain the patent's underlying inventive principle, which provided the baseline
for evaluating whether the defendant[ ]" infringed.).
48 This latter possibility is referred to as the reverse doctrine of equivalents,
and is often characterized as a feature of central claiming regimes. See Burk &
Lemley, supra note 11, at 1773 (identifying the origins of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents in central claiming). These cases might alternatively be understood
as non-literal peripheral claiming cases because the claims still define the outer-
most boundaries of the patentee's right to exclude. See Duffy, supra note 35, at
1205-06 (describing the reverse doctrine of equivalents as a required step in the
infringement analysis conducted under traditional peripheral claiming).
49 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853); see Anderson & Menell, supra note 13, at 15.
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Unlike prior rectangular coal cars, the claim in Winans was to a
car "in the form of a frustum of a cone."5 0 (A frustum of a cone
is a slice of a conical shape; imagine an ice cream cone with the
bottom third cleanly cut off parallel to the top and you have the
right idea.) The accused device was an octagonal car with slop-
ing sides; more precisely, the accused car's shape was a frus-
tum of a pyramid. The question in Winans was whether the
scope of the patent had to be limited to only circular conical
ones-as the claim language "frustum of a cone" suggested-or
instead could extend so as to cover octagonal coal cars with
sloping sides.
The Court concluded that octagonal coal cars might be
within the scope of the patentee's rights, reasoning that a pat-
ent "cover[s] . . . not only the precise forms [the patentee] has
described, but all other forms which embody his invention."5 1
That is, the scope of the patent would not be limited to the
particular embodiment described in the claim; instead, the
scope would extend to cover other machines that incorporated
"the substance of the invention."5 2 Because the intuition un-
derlying the invention was to distribute the "weight of the load
. . . equally in all directions," the claim could not be limited only
to cars "in the form of the frustum of a cone."5 3 It could also
include other shapes that distribute the "weight of the load ...
equally in all directions." 54
This is precisely what a court in a central claiming regime
should do. The words in the claims themselves were somewhat
narrow, limited to coal cars with circular conical walls. But the
court did not take the claims to mark some outer boundary of
the invention, that boundary identified by ascertaining the
meaning of the words "the form of the frustum of a cone." 5
Instead, the court understood the claims to identify some core
embodiment of the invention.5 6 The boundary of the patentee's
right was then extended beyond that embodiment, its reach
identified through a pragmatic analysis of what it was, exactly,
that Winans actually did in the world, as described in the pat-
50 Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 342.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 343.
53 Id. at 342.
54 Id. at 342-43. Whether an octagonal coal car in fact embodied this princi-
ple was a question left for the jury; the Court concluded only that the trial court
had improperly taken this question away from the jury on the grounds that the
claim could not, as a matter of law, cover anything other than circular coal cars.
See id. at 344.
55 See id. at 342-43.
56 See id. at 343.
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ent specification. The claim was accordingly understood to en-
compass a range of coal cars that captured the inventor's
contribution: the realization that the distribution of the coal's
weight placed too much and too uneven stress on a rectangular
car with straight sides, and that this problem could be solved
by building a (roughly) circular car with sloping sides.57
Peripheral and central claiming represent two ends on a
spectrum of potential approaches to identifying the invention,
and the patent system has long incorporated elements of
both.5 8 Today, the methodology for ascertaining whether a
claim is novel and whether an accused product literally in-
fringes it are closest to the peripheral end, while the doctrine of
equivalents is closest to the central end of the spectrum.5 9 And
courts occasionally still apply central claiming principles to
resolve claim construction disputes.6 0 Still, peripheral claim-
ing has been ascendant since its introduction in the 1800s,
and its dominance is now nearly complete. 6 1
2. Tradeoffs in Claim Interpretation
The case for central claiming starts from the premise that
the value of a patent ought to correspond to the value of the
invention the inventor has contributed to society. Inventions
(or at least the information underlying them) are public goods,
so we offer patents as incentives for private actors to invest in
their production and disclosure. 6 2 At least to a first approxi-
mation, if an inventor produces a more valuable invention, she
ought to receive a more valuable reward. This, in turn, will
encourage subsequent inventors to direct their efforts to the
inventions with the potential to produce the greatest value. To
the extent that a central claiming approach aims first to under-
57 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1747 ("Whereas peripheral claiming
purports to mark the outermost boundary of the patentee's claims, central claim-
ing describes the core or gist of the patentee's contribution to technology.").
58 See id. at 1771-74 (describing features of central claiming that survived
the patent system's more general shift to peripheral claiming).
59 See Fromer, supra note 11, at 735-38; see also Kevin Emerson Collins,
Getting into the "Spirit" of Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and Sub-
stitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1217, 1303-12 (2011) (arguing that even classic peripheral claiming incorpo-
rates some features typically associated with central claiming).
60 See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d
1296, 1304-05 (2011) (construing the claim term "body" to refer only to one-piece
structures because, inter aia, the specification criticized prior products for not
incorporating a "one piece outer body").
61 See Anderson & Menell, supra note 13, at 13-18.
62 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERIY LAw 294 (2003).
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stand what the inventor contributed, and then set the scope of
the legal rights accordingly, it increases the concordance be-
tween the contribution and the reward. There are a number of
complications to this simplified view of the patent system,63
but the basic intuition suffices here.
The primary justification for peripheral claiming, mean-
while, is that it promises better public notice.6 4 Interested
individuals can read the words in a patent's claims, and use
their understanding of those words to determine what the pat-
ent covers. There is no need for a sophisticated search for the
substance of the inventor's contribution; knowledge of the En-
glish language will suffice. On this view, peripheral claiming
reduces the "zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experi-
mentation [would otherwise] enter only at the risk of infringe-
ment claims."6 5 The choice between central and peripheral
claiming is then primarily a choice between aligning patent
scope with the inventor's contribution and providing the public
with notice of prohibited activity.
But peripheral claiming has not kept its promise. Instead
of the increased predictability that peripheral claiming ostensi-
bly could provide, patent scope remains fundamentally uncer-
tain.6 6 However difficult it may be to discern the inventor's
contribution, the semantic analysis of a word or phrase is often
no less difficult, even in seemingly easy and straightforward
63 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability
and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1915-17 (2013) (explaining that the
degree to which patents effectively exclude others will vary across inventions such
that the relative pecuniary value of patents will not correlate with the social value
of the underlying inventions).
64 See Fromer, supra note 11, at 761-62 ("In fact, the switch from central to
peripheral claiming in patent law has principally been defended as providing the
public with better content notice of the set of protected embodiments.").
65 Nautilus, Inc. v. Blosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014)
(quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
66 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1745 ("The key feature of peripheral
claiming, setting out clear boundaries to warn the public of what is and is not
claimed-the 'notice function' of patents that has received so much attention in
recent years-increasingly seems to be an illusion." (footnote omitted)). The no-
tice problem in patent law has been extensively explored. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN
& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK 17-19 (2008) (arguing that inadequacy of notice provided by
patents has led to rising patent litigation costs); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY,
THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SoLvE IT 28 (2009) (asserting that
uncertainty in the nature and scope of patents will lead to more litigation); ADAM
B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 171-72
(2004) (focusing on policies to reduce uncertainty as a way to reduce costly patent
infringement claims).
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cases. 6 7 Imagine a firm trying to determine whether a proposed
product infringes a given patent. In a central claiming regime,
the firm might be unsure whether its proposed product incor-
porates the inventor's core contribution; in a peripheral claim-
ing regime, it would be similarly unsure whether the claim's
use of the word "a" means "one and only one" or "one or
more. "68
As a result, several scholars have argued that the patent
system ought to at least partially move back to a central claim-
ing regime.69 Jeanne Fromer, for example, contends that cen-
tral claiming might provide better notice than peripheral
claiming because people categorize radially-that is, by ex-
tending outwards from a typical case to related cases-rather
than by identifying the necessary and sufficient properties of
the entire class. 70 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that
courts, as backward-looking institutions, would be better off
67 See Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the "Invention"?, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1855, 1913 (2012) (arguing that in moving from an external invention-ori-
ented approach to a claim-centered approach "the ambiguity shift[s] from ques-
tions of insubstantial differences to the meaning of claim terms that have multiple
dictionary definitions"); Fromer, supra note 11, at 763 ("[Pleripheral claims' un-
predictability relates to the interpretation of claim words, while for central claims,
it relates to the extent and shape of similarity to the claimed embodiments.").
68 Yes, really. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1753. This exact ambi-
guity has been the source of more than one Federal Circuit opinion. See Voda v.
Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1319-22 (Fed. Cir. 2008); N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1575-77 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For over a dozen
district and appellate court decisions on whether "a" should be given a singular or
plural meaning, see CHISUM, supra note 33, § 6-18B, at nn.387-88. As Christo-
pher Cotropia explains, the uncertainty associated with ascertaining an invention
in a central claiming (which roughly corresponds to what he refers to as an
external invention) regime flows from underlying policy-relevant questions about
the appropriate degree of exclusivity to award a patentee; in a peripheral claiming
regime, however, the uncertainty flows from arguably policy-irrelevant and per-
haps superficially random reasons related to linguistic ambiguity. See Cotropia,
supra note 67, at 1912-13.
69 In a related vein, Oskar Lilvak argues that the focus on the claim and
disregard for the invention is unjustified in light of both the constitutional and
statutory foundations of patent law. See Oskar Lilvak, Rescuing the Invention
from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 16-31 (2012). And Christo-
pher Cotropia contends that patent law has lost its moorings in part because it
uses an internal definition of the invention-focusing on the claim language-
rather than an external one-focusing on what the inventor did in the world. See
Cotropia, supra note 67, at 1891-905. While neither Lilvak nor Cotropia frame
their analyses in terms of central and peripheral claiming, their approaches have
obvious parallels with the one described here.
70 See Fromer, supra note 11, at 763-66. Central claiming might also reduce
the costs associated with claim drafting to the extent that it demands less linguis-
tic precision. See id. at 757-59. One potentially important disadvantage of cen-
tral claiming is that it may be more difficult for the examiner to determine whether
a claim satisfies the patentability requirements. See id. at 768.
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with the flexibility that central claiming provides because it
would allow them to transparently tailor patent scope to the
circumstances of any given dispute; this would represent an
improvement from the current situation, in which courts twist
claim language to reach just results.7 1
Still, some scholars defend the peripheral claiming regime.
Henry Smith, for example, asserts that a peripheral claiming
approach is preferable because it requires an evaluation only of
the boundaries of the right, rather than the entirety of the
right, which is preferred in the light of the high delineation
costs associated with novel technology.72 John Duffy takes an
apparently middle position, arguing that the problems with the
patent system are not a result of its reliance on a peripheral
claiming methodology, which emphasizes the outer boundaries
of the patentee's rights, but rather its excessively literalistic
approach to ascertaining those boundaries.7 3
Despite their differences, these scholars all agree on one
thing: peripheral claiming dominates today's patent system.7 4
While vestiges of the central claiming system remain, the con-
sensus view is that the patent system relies primarily on pe-
ripheral claiming. 75 And this consensus may well have been
correct in the recent past.
But it is no longer accurate. Over the past decade, the
Supreme Court's patentable subject matter jurisprudence has
resurrected central claiming, placing it at the very heart of the
71 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1782-83.
72 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitle-
ments in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1807 (2007) (defending peripheral
claiming because the "definition of claims focuses on the outer bounds of what is
claimed as an invention, without the need to specify the interior").
73 See Duffy, supra note 35, at 1216-20 (concluding that a traditional periph-
eral approach would be preferable to the literalistic approach of the Federal Cir-
cuit in part because the literalistic approach has not "produced more certainty in
property rights definition" and the traditional approach "would not undermine the
certainty of the right's core").
74 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1770-74 (suggesting that the 1996
Markman decision turned "a hybrid peripheral-claiming system" into one that is
almost purely peripheral); Duffy, supra note 35, at 1201-10 (describing the mod-
ern approach as a literalistic version of peripheral claiming); Fromer, supra note
11, at 731-35 (recounting the history of the shift from central to peripheral claim-
ing); Smith, supra note 72, at 1807 (describing "today's 'peripheral' approach" in
patent law).
75 The most prominent remnants are the doctrine of equivalents and means-
plus-function claiming. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1772-74. Scholars
disagree whether the practice of dependent claiming should be understood as an
element of central claiming in our modem system. Compare Fromer, supra note
11, at 739-40 (arguing that dependent claims "share traits with central claim-
ing"), with Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1746 n. 15 (disputing Fromer's
characterization of dependent claims as "elements of central claiming").
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most important issue in patent law today: just what kinds of
things can someone patent in the first place?
B. The Death and Birth of Patentable Subject Matter
The roots of patent eligibility are nominally found in 35
U.S.C. § 101, which permits anyone who "invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter" to "obtain a patent." 76 This broad statutory
language is typically qualified by three judicially-crafted excep-
tions: laws of nature, natural phenomena (also referred to as
products of nature), and abstract ideas.7 7 Although the Su-
preme Court often traces its historical pedigree back over a
century, the modem law of patentable subject matter can more
precisely find its origin in the wake of the 1952 Patent Act.78
That is when the Court decided a trilogy of abstract ideas
cases-Gottschalk v. Bensort,79 Parker v. Flook,80 and Diamond
v. Dieh 1'-that established the framework in which we operate
today.
This trilogy, however, left a confusing legacy, with Flook
and Diehr proving particularly vexing. Both cases involved the
use of mathematical formulas to improve well-known chemical
76 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
77 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70
(2012). This has long been an area where caselaw predominates. See Duffy,
supra note 8, at 621.
78 See J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions,
17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 271-77 (2015). There are much older cases-
dating back to the 1800s-that are now understood as patentable subject matter
cases. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89
TEX. L. REv. 1041, 1075 (2011) ("Chronicles of U.S. courts' efforts to regulate
subject-matter eligibility commonly start at least as early as the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1854 decision of O'Reilly v. Morse."). But they fit uneasily in the modem
framework because the patent system was so different then, lacking, for example,
a statutory non-obviousness requirement. See id. at 1075-76; Holman, supra
note 5, at 1800; Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 Hous.
L. REV. 563, 569 n. 16 (2012). Because there was some kind of patentable subject
matter requirement, even if poorly developed or understood, it is not quite right to
say that the patentable subject matter doctrine started after the 1952 Patent Act.
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REv. 565, 565
(2015). The post-1952 cases, however, appear to adopt a framework quite differ-
ent from the pre-1952 ones, and the grounding of the current doctrine in Section
101 of the present statute (enacted as part of the 1952 Patent Act) suggests that
there is a distinct, modem patentable subject matter doctrine. For this reason, I
start with the major cases following the 1952 Patent Act, which, although it
codified some pre-existing law, established the basic framework in which we
operate today. See id. at 570.
79 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
80 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
81 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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processes; but while the claims in Flook were held ineligible,
those in Diehr survived. 82 Nearly forty years later, scholars
continue to contend that they are simply irreconcilable. 3
Rather than confront the tension between Flook and Dtehr,
subsequent decisions relied principally on the Supreme Court's
next pronouncement on patentable subject matter: Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.8 4 Ananda Chakrabarty had discovered a way to
add four plasmids-genetic material existing apart from chro-
mosomal DNA-to a Pseudomonas bacterium.8 5 Because
Pseudomonas was a pre-existing genus of bacteria, and each of
the four plasmids existed independently before Chakrabarty's
work, the claim could plausibly be understood as covering
nothing more than ineligible products of nature. Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that Chakrabarty's claim satisfied the pat-
entable subject matter requirement because it covered "a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature and one having the potential for significant
utility."8 6
Courts then largely ignored the irreconcilable results in
Benson, Flook, and Diehr in favor of the simplicity of
Chakrabarty.8 7 The post-Chakrabarty era is neatly encapsu-
lated by the Court's suggestion in that case that "anything
under the sun that is made by man" is patentable. 8 Not coin-
cidentally, the decades following Chakrabarty saw patents is-
sued on everything from human genes to a method of buying
junk on the internet with only one click.8 9 In short, for nearly
thirty years, the patentable subject matter question was an-
swered simply "yes."
82 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184; Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
83 See Chao, supra note 10, at 89 ("Flook and Diehr are simply irreconcila-
ble."); Golden, supra note 7, at 1781.
84 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
85 Id. at 305-06. Each of the four plasmids was able to break down a different
component of oil, and the idea was to use Pseudomonas incorporating those
plasmids to clean up oil spills. Id.
86 Id. at 310.
87 See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L.
REv. 1139, 1160 (1999) (describing the state of eligibility doctrine in 1999 as
"hardly an exaggeration to say that if you can name it, you can claim it").
88 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Patent Law Codification and Revi-
sion: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico, Examiner in Chief,
United States Patent Office)).
89 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) (claiming a
method of purchasing goods on the internet with one click); U.S. Patent No.
5,747,282 (issued May 5, 1998) (claiming an isolated human gene).
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This changed dramatically with a quartet of cases begin-
ning in 2010: Bilski v. Kappos,9 0 Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,9 1 Association for Molecular Pa-
thology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,92 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Internationa9 3 In sharp contrast to the permissive practice
that prevailed until then, the Supreme Court held claims ineli-
gible in each of those cases, thereby reinvigorating what was
thought to be a moribund doctrine.9 4 The patentable subject
matter doctrine now imposes real limits on what can be pat-
ented. 95 What those limits are, however, remains unclear.
C. Problems in the Subject Matter Revolution
There are some easy patentable subject matter cases:
Shakespeare could not patent a sonnet, and Einstein could not
patent E = mc 2 ; meanwhile, Eli Whitney could patent the cotton
gin, and Thomas Edison could patent the phonograph.9 6 Aside
from those kinds of examples, though, commentators have
struggled to make sense of the Court's patentable subject mat-
ter jurisprudence. 9 7
The emerging framework is a two-step inquiry, referred to
as the Mayo or Alice test, after the cases that introduced and
formalized it, respectively. At Step One, a court must "deter-
mine whether the claims at issue are directed to" a law of
90 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
91 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
92 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
93 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
94 See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes:
An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 350-51 (2015) (describ-
ing how "[nearly three decades of silent acquiescence" by the Supreme Court
"gave way to five years of patent eligibility hysterics"). The Supreme Court's inter-
vention in this area was perhaps foreshadowed by the Federal Circuit. See In re
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2007); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit's Acquiescence(?), 66 AM.
U. L. REv. 1061, 1075-80 (2017) (describing the at times tense relationship be-
tween the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in this era).
9s See Michael Risch, Nothing is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REv. FORUM 45, 45-51
(2015).
96 See Lemley et al., supra note 8, at 1328 (characterizing patents on gravity
or relativity as "the easy cases").
97 See Holman, supra note 5, at 1822 ("Given the lack of clarity in the Court's
patent eligibility decisions, there appears to be a strong consensus that the pri-
mary outcome of the Supreme Court's recent patent eligibility decisions has been
increased confusion in the lower courts, the FTO, and the innovator commu-
nity."); Lefstin, supra note 9, at 649-50 (noting that "there is now less clarity on
the basic question of patent-eligibility than at almost any other time in American
patent law" and that the "major obstacle to consistency and predictability in the
field is the incoherence of the Supreme Court's opinions").
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nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea. 9  If not, then the
claims are eligible and the inquiry is complete. But if the court
concludes that the claims are directed to ineligible subject mat-
ter, then it proceeds to Step Two: "ask what else is there" in the
claim elements that could "transform the nature of the claim
into a patent-eligible application" of the ineligible subject mat-
ter.99 This second step has also been called "a search for an
'inventive concept'-Le., an element or combination of elements
that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts
to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself."100 Each step presents its own difficulties.
Start with Mayo Step One. The inquiry here seeks to deter-
mine whether the invention is "directed to" ineligible subject
matter. But, as the Court itself has recognized, "all inventions
at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas."' 0 And it can-
not be that all inventions are "directed to" ineligible subject
matter in the sense that Step One would care about; otherwise,
we could just go straight to Step Two in every case. If there is a
Step One asking whether the invention is "directed to" ineligi-
ble subject matter, then in some cases the answer has to be
"no."
So how close or what kind of a relationship does Step One
look for between the invention and the prohibited categories?
Consider (a caricature of) a claim to a hammer: "A device for
striking objects comprising a handle and a head perpendicu-
larly attached to said handle, wherein said head is heavier than
said handle." The hammer, of course, depends on Newton's
laws-if force didn't equal mass times acceleration, the ham-
mer wouldn't work (or at least it wouldn't work the way we
know a hammer does work). And Newton's laws are paradig-
matic laws of nature.1 0 2 But it can't be the case that the claim
98 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
99 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
100 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
101 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71
(2012); Chiang, supra note 8, at 1863-64 ("As a purely semantic matter, virtually
every patent claim can be said to cover a 'law of nature' or 'abstract idea,' because
no patent claim is limited to a fixed set of concrete physical embodiments-all
patent claims are directed to an infinite set of objects that is defined by some
principle, and it is always possible to characterize that defining principle as a 'law
of nature' or 'abstract idea.'" (footnote omitted)); Duffy, supra note 8, at 643
(recognizing that "inventors' contributions . .. are all grounded in nature's princi-
ples"); Lemley, supra note 37, at 1277 ("Indeed, most inventions at their heart
involve a new application of some natural law or object.").
102 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); cf. Golden, supra
note 78, at 1079 (noting that "according to modern science, Newton's theories are
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to the hammer is "directed to" ineligible subject matter, such
that it is patentable only if it also contains an "inventive con-
cept." Otherwise, all inventions would be "directed to" ineligi-
ble subject matter; the existence of a Step One inquiry
independent of Step Two rejects that possibility.
Step Two presents as many complications as Step One.
The fact that a claim is directed to ineligible subject matter is
not fatal; to the contrary, applications of laws of nature, natu-
ral phenomena, and abstract ideas remain patent eligible.1 0 3
The Mayo framework asks us to identify at Step Two an "inven-
tive concept" that might transform an ineligible patent on ex-
cluded subject matter into a patent-eligible application of that
excluded subject matter. 104
But what is an "inventive concept"? In Alice, for example,
the claims were deemed to be directed to the abstract idea of
intermediated settlement-that is, using a clearinghouse to re-
duce the risk that a counterparty to a transaction would not
have the funds to complete the deal. 0 5 The Court concluded
that the claims were ineligible because they "amount[ed] to
'nothing significantly more' than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspeci-
fied, generic computer" and that this "is not 'enough' to trans-
form an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention."106 How
much, though, is "enough"?10 7 And "enough" of what?
not really laws of nature at all; they are no more than approximate descriptions or
models").
103 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (recognizing the three exceptions to patentable sub-
ject matter must have limits because "all inventions at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas").
104 The Court has probably misconstrued earlier cases regarding the "inven-
tive concept" requirement. See Lefstin, supra note 78, at 640-45 (explaining the
history of the "inventive concept" and concluding that "it is equally clear that
Flook and Mayo founded the inventive application test on a profoundly mistaken
interpretation of Neilson and the other hot-blast cases"). I focus here on how the
modem cases approach Step Two, even if it is built on a mistaken.understanding
of the historical roots.
105 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356.
106 Id. at 2359-60.
107 John Duffy, Opinion Analysis: The Uncertain Expansion of Judge-Made
Exceptions to Patentability, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 12:46 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-analysis-the-uncertain-expansion-of-
judge- made-exceptions-to-patentability/ [https://perma.cc/5IAT-5BWZ ("I'll
have to teach this 'enough' test next semester. I'll be sure to use Italics, just like
the Court did, but I'm not convinced that even with the different font, the enough
test will give much guidance to my students, or to the lawyers, judges and Patent
Office officials who will have to apply it to numerous other situations.").
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Repeated references in Mayo and Alice to "conventional" or
"well-understood" activity described by the ineligible claims in
those cases suggest that the "inventive concept" demands that
the inventor point to something unusual or surprising in her
application of the prohibited subject matter. 108 But such a
demand seems uncomfortably close to patent law's novelty and
non-obviousness requirements. 109 If we must determine, at
the subject matter stage, whether the claim describes an unex-
pected or previously unknown element, then why should we
also ask later whether the differences between the invention
and the prior art would have been obvious to people working in
the field?
Scholars have largely tried to solve these puzzles by resort
to first principles. The premise is that if only we could identify
the "right" normative theory of patentable subject matter, we
could understand the contours of the existing doctrine.1 0 This
search for first principles is, unfortunately, misguided. The
problems of the Court's patentable subject matter jurispru-
dence are not primarily normative problems-they are doctri-
nal ones. And they accordingly have doctrinal solutions. These
solutions may well be unsatisfying or undesirable from a nor-
mative perspective. But before we can fix the normative
108 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (reasoning that the claimed invention did not
include an inventive concept because, inter alia, it simply recited "well-under-
stood, routine, conventional activity" (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79 (same).
109 See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at 379 ("It seems apparent from the
passages in Mayo and Alice that the 'inventive concept' inquiry permits courts to
undertake a quasi-Section 102 and 103 analysis for patentability over the prior
art, without the need to qualify any single piece of evidence as prior art or consult
the immense jurisprudence of Sections 102 or 103."); Rebecca Eisenberg, Sympo-
siurm Business Methods as "Abstract Ideas"-Explaining the Opacity of Alice and
Bilski, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2014/06/symposium-business-methods-as-abstract-ideas-explaining-the-opac-
ity-of-alice-and-bilski/ [https://perma.cc/6FV6-26CA] (criticizing the Court for
"conflating the issue of patent eligibility with the distinct issue of patent worthi-
ness"). The Court has recognized but dismissed this concern. See Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) ("The obligation to determine what type of discov-
ery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of whether that
discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.").
110 See Chiang, supra note 8, at 1873 (arguing "that the current PSM law and
PSM debates cannot be intelligently understood without examining" the moral
values at stake in patentable subject matter); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of
the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods
After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNEr 1, 7 (2012) (considering
"alternative accounts of the work that patentable subject matter doctrine might do
for the patent system in the hope of clarifying the application of that doctrine to
diagnostic method claims").
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problems with the Court's jurisprudence, we need to under-
stand just what it is that the cases require.
II
THE CENTRAL CLAIMING RENAISSANCE
To solve the puzzles of the Court's patentable subject mat-
ter jurisprudence, we must first understand how the Court is
answering an antecedent doctrinal question: what is the inven-
tion to which the patentable subject matter requirements ap-
ply? The usual way courts identify the invention is to read the
claim, and resolve disputes about how people in the field would
understand it.11 1 What the inventor actually did in the world,
or how her alleged contribution compares to what preceded it-
these things have almost nothing to do with how the modem
patent system defines the invention. 1 1 2
The Court's patentable subject matter jurisprudence is dif-
ferent. Some commentators have noticed that the Court is not
doing what we think is supposed to happen in run-of-the-mill
modem patent law-it sure doesn't look like the peripheral
claiming approach we're used to. 113 These commentators criti-
cize the Court for adopting a "'shoot from the hip' mentality
that deemphasizes the literal language of the claims."1 14 That
critique would hit the mark if the Court were applying a stan-
dard peripheral claiming framework, in which the goal is to use
the language of the claims to define the outer limits of the
patentee's rights.
But that is not what the Court is doing. The doctrinal
solution to patentable subject matter lies in recognizing the
most important implication of the Court's recent eligibility
cases: central claiming is reborn. In this Part, I will first show
111 Lilvak, supra note 69, at 11.
112 See id. at 7 ("Because the claims define the invention, the invention itself
has no substantive existence other than as a shorthand for the subject matter
that a patentee can claim.").
113 See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at 363-77 (describing problems with
claim construction in eligibility jurisprudence); Lefstin, supra note 78, at 645-48
(arguing that the question "whether a claim embodies an inventive application of"
ineligible subject matter is "an ill-formed question" in light of Judge Rich's para-
digm that the "invention is the physical matter or steps defined by the claims and
nothing more or less," and pointing to this as a source of tension between Mayo
and the Federal Circuit's application of that case); cf. Golden, supra note 78, at
1059 (suggesting that "claim construction often need occur at only a crude, per-
haps largely inchoate level in order to establish whether a claim passes the re-
quirement of subject-matter eligibility").
114 Holman, supra note 5, at 1808; see Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at
364-66 (arguing that "the Court's recent eligibility jurisprudence offers no gui-
dance on the relationship between eligibility analysis and claim construction").
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that the Court uses a central claiming approach at Step One. I
will then explore the Court's Step Two analysis; although it is
not entirely clear, the Court is most likely applying an interme-
diate approach-known as point of novelty-at Step Two. Once
we understand how the Court is identifying the invention, we
can begin to answer some of the questions raised by its eligibil-
ity jurisprudence.
A. Central Claiming at Step One
Step One asks whether a claim is directed to ineligible
subject matter. The Court has implicitly relied on a central
claiming analysis to answer this question. This is most evident
in Mayo CoUaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc."i5 Prometheus owned a patent describing a method for
dealing with metabolic variation in patients taking thiopurine
drugs.116 Its scientists developed the method after discovering
the precise thresholds of thiopurine metabolites that correlated
with the drug's efficacy and toxicity.11 7 The Court's treatment
of Step One was brief; here's the whole thing:
Prometheus' patents set forth laws of nature-namely, rela-
tionships between concentrations of certain metabolites in
the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine
drug will prove ineffective or cause harm. Claim 1, for exam-
ple, states that if the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of a patient
who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug) exceed about 400
pmol per 8x108 red blood cells, then the administered dose is
likely to produce toxic side effects. While it takes a human
action (the administration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger a
manifestation of this relation in a particular person, the rela-
tion itself exists in principle apart from any human action.
The relation is a consequence of the ways in which thiopurine
compounds are metabolized by the body-entirely natural
processes. And so a patent that simply describes that rela-
tion sets forth a natural law. 118
The Court understood the claim as describing the "rela-
tionships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the
blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will
15 566 U.S. 66 (2012). The "directed to" formulation first arose in the Alice
Court's discussion of Mayo. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2355 (2014) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76-78) ("First, we determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.").
116 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 67-68.
117 Id at 73-75.
118 Id. at 77.
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prove ineffective or cause harm." 119 This understanding ig-
nores language that would more narrowly circumscribe the
patent's reach in a peripheral claiming analysis. The claim
recited actual steps that a human must perform-administer-
ing the drug and determining the metabolite levels-as well as
a practical implication of the relationship between metabolites
and drug toxicity or efficacy-that there is a need to adjust the
dosage. 12 0 So why not characterize the claim as setting forth a
process for guiding dosage decisions, incorporating those phys-
ical steps, rather than simply setting forth the underlying
relationship?
The answer lies in the implicit object of the Step One in-
quiry: the inventor's contribution to the field. Recall that Step
One asks "whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
[the] patent-ineligible concepts." 12 1 But the antecedent ques-
tion is what are "the claims at issue . .. directed to."122 That is,
before we assess whether the underlying correlations are ineli-
gible laws of nature, we need to determine whether the claims
are "directed to" those correlations.
The Mayo Court answered this antecedent question by
conducting a central claiming search for the inventor's contri-
bution. Based on its reading of the specification, the Court
noted that other scientists had already identified the thi-
opurine metabolites responsible for therapeutic effects and tox-
icity. 1 2 3 What was missing were the precise metabolite
thresholds that enabled doctors to determine whether a dosage
of thiopurine was too high or too low for a particular patient. 124
And that is what the inventors provided-nothing more, but
also nothing less. 125
That is why the Court characterized the representative
claim as "stat[ing] that if the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of a
patient who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug) exceed
about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells, then the adminis-
tered dose is likely to produce toxic side effects."1 26 This is not
119 Id.
120 Id. at 74-75.
121 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
122 Id
123 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 74 (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 B2 col. 8 11. 37-40
(filed Apr. 8, 1999)).
124 JCL
125 Id. (concluding that the patented process "embod[ied] researchers' findings
that identified these correlations"-that is, the "precise correlations between me-
tabolite levels and likely harm or ineffectiveness"-"with some precision").
126 I& at 77.
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what the claim actually said.1 27 But it is an entirely sensible
understanding of what the inventors added to the storehouse of
knowledge: a precise description of the relationship between 6-
TG levels and the probability of efficacy or toxicity. Because
that relationship "exists in principle apart from any human
action," the claim was directed to a law of nature.1 28 This use
of the specification to determine what the inventors actually
contributed is the hallmark of a central claiming approach.1 2 9
It also contrasts with a peripheral claiming approach.
Such an approach would have resolved disputes about the
meanings of particular words that appeared in the claim, and
used those meanings to set the boundary of the claim's scope.
The patentable subject matter inquiry would have then turned
on whether things that fell within that boundary should have
remained outside.
On a peripheral claiming approach, the Court may well
have determined that the claim was not directed to a natural
law. The claim recited, inter alia, "administering a [thiopurine]
drug," and "determining the level" of the metabolites.o3 0 Ac-
cepting arguendo the Court's definition of a natural law as
something "exist[ing] in principle apart from any human ac-
tion,"13 1 each step could have been understood as limiting the
patent's scope to something other than the natural law itself
because each step demanded some kind of human action: ad-
ministering a drug and determining a metabolite level.
True, from a practical perspective, we couldn't do the
most useful thing we would want to do with the relationship-
adjust dosage in response to patient-specific metabolic infor-
mation-unless we performed the administering and determin-
ing steps. So there is a sense in which the claim might be
understood as coextensive with the law of nature. But the
metabolic process that gives rise to the relationship-that is,
the natural law itself-could occur without infringing the pat-
ent; simply imagine a patient taking a thiopurine drug and
never determining the metabolite levels. The level of metabo-
lites in that patient's body would in fact correlate with the
127 See U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 B2 col. 20 11. 10-20 (filed Apr. 8, 1999).
128 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77.
129 See Fromer, supra note 11, at 733-34 n.67 (arguing that O'Reilly v. Morse
reflects central claiming principles because it relies on "the notion that the inven-
tion's described embodiments and principles-rather than [its] claims . . . are
central to the determination of the set of embodiments upon which the patent
right operates").
130 U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 B2 col. 20 11. 10-15 (filed Apr. 8, 1999).
131 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77.
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drug's efficacy and toxicity, as the natural law dictates. Moreo-
ver, we could read or think about the natural law without ad-
ministering the drug or determining metabolite levels.
Researchers might then be able to use the law disclosed here to
develop predictions about how the body might metabolize
other, related substances.
A plausible view, if not the inevitable or even most persua-
sive one, is that none of these things would be within the scope
of the claim under a peripheral claiming approach that sets the
outer boundaries of the inventors' rights somewhere no further
than a method incorporating both the administration of the
drug and the determination of metabolite concentrations. It
would have been possible on a peripheral claiming approach to
understand the claim much more narrowly than the Court ap-
parently did.
But at Step One, the Court did not attempt to identify the
outer boundary of the patentee's rights by reference to the
words of the claim. 132 That the Court did not consider these
possibilities suggests that whatever Step One requires a court
to do, it does not need to conduct a peripheral claiming analy-
sis to do it. Indeed, the words of the claim were almost entirely
absent from the Step One analysis. That, in itself, is telling.
Simply put, Mayo is what a central claiming approach to
Step One looks like. And that matters because it transforms
the Court's analysis from a free-form, intuitive feel for whether
the patent seems suspect into a central claiming analysis of
patent scope. 133
Astute patent readers might contend here that whatever
happens at Step One, the Court's patentable subject matter
jurisprudence requires a peripheral claiming analysis at Step
Two. As I will discuss momentarily, that view is probably incor-
rect, although I cannot quite rule it out. But even if it were
correct, the point remains: central claiming has taken on a
fundamental role in the patent system. Mayo-and the eligibil-
ity framework established in its wake-uses a central claiming
approach to resolve the Step One question of whether claims
are directed to ineligible subject matter. It is therefore a central
132 It is therefore inconsistent with the traditional peripheral claiming ap-
proach. See Duffy, supra note 35, at 1201-10.
133 Cf. Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at 373 (contending that Alice "left the
lower courts with nearly untrammeled discretion to embrace or ignore claim lan-
guage in formulating their eligibility analyses").
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claiming analysis that determines whether an inventor has met
the basic threshold of patent eligibility. 1 3 4
Nor is Mayo an isolated example. The last (for now) in the
Court's patentable subject matter cases is Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International.135 Alice is a more challenging case because
a central claiming approach turns on what the inventors con-
tributed to the field, and it is unclear whether the Alice inven-
tors contributed anything at all. Although the inventors in
Mayo had at a minimum identified the precise metabolite
thresholds at which thiopurine drugs become ineffective or
toxic, it did not seem as though the inventors in Alice did any-
thing other than patent something that people have been doing
for millennia: using an intermediary to mitigate settlement
risk. While the core of the claim in Mayo contained a natural
law, the core of the claim in Alice was plausibly empty.
Still, Alice reflects central claiming principles. The claim
recited, inter alia, "a computer-implemented scheme" using "a
third-party intermediary" to mitigate "the risk that only one
party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes."136
Again, before deciding whether the thing that the claims were
directed to was an abstract idea, the Court had to address the
antecedent question-what were the claims directed to? The
Court's answer: the claims were "drawn to the concept of inter-
mediated settlement, Le., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk."1 37
Focus again on the methodology the Court used to identify
the invention that had to satisfy the subject matter inquiry.
The Court made little effort to determine whether the claim
language placed some outer limits on the scope of the inven-
tor's rights. Had it done so, the Court might have concluded,
for example, that the "exchange institutions" recited in the
claims limited the patentee's rights to intermediated settlement
among parties with bank accounts.' 38 Or that the claims' ref-
erence to "supervisory institutions" required the establishment
of particular specialized entities that performed only intermedi-
ated settlement work.139 Or that the claims' requirement that
settlement occur only at "end-of-day" or in chronological order
limited their scope to transactions of a particular kind.1 40
134 See Chiang, supra note 8, at 1870-71.
135 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
136 Id. at 2351-52.
137 Id. at 2356.
138 See itd. at 2352 n.2.
139 See id.
140 See id.
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This is not to say that the Court was wrong about the
claims being drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement.
And it is not to say that, had the Court emphasized the mean-
ings of "exchange institutions" or "supervisory institutions" or
"end-of-day," it would necessarily have arrived at the interpre-
tations proposed above or concluded that the invention satis-
fied Step One, let alone Step Two. Nor is it to say that, if
eligible, such a patent would satisfy the novelty and non-obvi-
ousness requirements: spoiler, it wouldn't.
It simply demonstrates that the Court at Step One is not
taking a peripheral claiming approach to the invention. In-
stead, the Court is first looking to the patent as a whole to
ascertain just what it is that the inventors (assert they have)
contributed. 14 1 As does Mayo, then, Alice reflects the Court's
use of central claiming to answer the Step One "directed to"
question. And although I will have more to say later about
Bilski and Myriad-the remaining two cases in the Court's re-
cent subject matter quartet-suffice it to say for now that they
are similar. 1 4 2
As an aside, it is worth asking whether this return to cen-
tral claiming is intentional. The Court has not made an explicit
reference to the choice between peripheral and central claiming
in its eligibility jurisprudence. And we do not today have ac-
cess to the Court's internal deliberations.
Still, until its most recent quartet, the Court's last foray
into patentable subject matter began in the 1970s.143 While
those cases were decided well into the peripheral claiming era,
they traced the roots of patentable subject matter doctrine
back to a series of cases-O'Reilly v. Morse, 1 4 4 Le Roy v. Ta-
tham,145 and Neilson v. Harfordl46-from the mid-1800s.1 4 7 As
141 See id. at 2352 (quoting App. at 243, 248) (describing the invention in
general terms as a method enabling parties to manage risk).
142 See infra text accompanying notes 184-90 (explaining that Bilski deemed
the claim to be directed to the ineligible concept of hedging risk but the specifica-
tion did not describe a plausible contribution to the art); infra text accompanying
notes 268-96 (reconsidering Myriad as a Step Two inventive concept case).
143 See Lefstin, supra note 78, at 573 (explaining that the Court did not ad-
dress the issue of patent eligibility between Dlehr and Bilsk).
144 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853); see also Lemley et al., supra note 8, at
1332-33 (describing Morse as a patentable subject matter case notwithstanding
arguments that it can be understood as an enablement case).
145 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852).
146 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
147 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (relying on the "landmark decision
in" Morse and the rule from Neilson to invalidate the claim); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 68 (beginning its eligibility analysis with a discussion of Morse); see
also Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN.
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Jeffrey Lefstin has explained, the Court's 1970s cases appear
to have built the substantive "inventive concept" requirement
on a misreading of the substantive standards that Morse, Le
Roy, and Netison applied. 1 4  Similarly, those mid- 1800s cases
were applying a central claiming approach to the invention,
rather than the peripheral claiming approach that prevailed in
the 1970s.1 4 9 The Court may have overlooked this difference in
claim interpretation, and the Court's recently reignited interest
in patentable subject matter may have then unwittingly revived
those old cases' central claiming approach to understanding
what a claim covers in the first place.15 0 Whether intentional
or otherwise, though, the upshot is that the Court's modem
eligibility jurisprudence is built on a central claiming
foundation.
B. The Step Two Puzzle
Turn now to Step Two. Recall that Step Two is "a search for
an inventive concept" that would ensure that the inventor is
not simply seeking a patent upon the ineligible subject matter
itself. 15 1 Even if Step One reflects central claiming principles,
it is tempting to read Step Two as reflecting peripheral claiming
principles.
This temptation arises because, while claim language is
nearly irrelevant at Step One, it does make a difference at Step
Two. For example, the Mayo Court at Step Two viewed the
claimed invention as comprising three distinct steps, each cor-
responding to one of three actions identified in the claim lan-
guage.1 5 2 And the Court explored whether the combination of
TECH. L. REV. 257, 261 (2013) (describing the importance and ambiguity ofjuris-
prudence from the 1800s for patent law generally, and for patentable subject
matter specifically).
148 See generally Lefstin, supra note 78, at 623-45 (arguing that the inventive
application requirement developed in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.
and Parker v. Flook is based on "a profoundly mistaken interpretation of Neilson").
149 See Burk & Leiley, supra note 11, at 1748 (describing the consensus view
that today's peripheral claiming system dates back to the late 1870s). Indeed,
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853), a classic example of central
claiming, was decided by the Court the same year as Morse and Le Roy.
15o See Beauchamp, supra note 147, at 262, 268-76 (describing the difficulty
of "translating the older case law ... into the modem doctrinal framework" in the
context of patentable subject matter, and illustrating this challenge by tracing the
roots of the products of nature doctrine).
151 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
152 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78-79
(2012).
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steps might make some difference to its analysis.15 3 Mayo's
Step Two inquiry thus did not simply examine the nature of the
inventors' contribution, as revealed in the specification; in-
stead, it identified particular elements in the claim language,
and assigned a specific meaning to each element. The Alice
Court did the same. 1 5 4 So the particular way in which the
claim is drafted has more significance at Step Two than it does
at Step One.
Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that Step Two pur-
sues modern peripheral claiming business as usual. Consider
Mayo's analysis of the claim element "administering a drug
providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-me-
diated gastrointestinal disorder."155 Modem peripheral claim-
ing would provide that this element identifies an outermost
boundary of the claim's scope, set largely by the term "adminis-
tering." Patent lawyers would argue about what that term
means-maybe it means writing a prescription, maybe it re-
quires making the drug, or maybe it is limited to thrice-daily
administrations. A court would then resolve these ambiguities
by deciding what a person of ordinary skill in the art would
think the word "administering" means.
But there were no real disputes about what the word "ad-
ministering" means, and the person of ordinary skill played no
role in the Court's analysis of this step.15 6 Instead, the Court
reasoned that "the 'administering' step simply refers to the rele-
vant audience, namely, doctors who treat patients with certain
diseases with thiopurine drugs."' 57 Whatever the word "ad-
ministering" means, there is no plausible argument that it
"simply refers to the relevant audience" from the perspective of
a person of ordinary skill or anyone else. So this isn't the
peripheral claiming approach we're used to.
153 Id. at 79 ("[To consider the three steps as an ordered combination adds
nothing to the laws of nature that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately.").
154 The Alice Court identified four distinct steps in the claimed method, and
reasoned that the "claim elements separately" were insufficient to save the claims
because the "function[s] performed . . . at each step" were "well-understood,
routine, conventional activities." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).
155 The Court's analysis of the "determining" step was similar. See Mayo, 132
S. Ct. at 1297-98.
156 See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at 363 ("[The hypothetical person
having ordinary skill in the art[ I] has been accorded no place in the Supreme
Court's modem eligibility cases.").
157 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78.
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We might then ask whether the Court's approach at Step
Two corresponds to what John Duffy calls traditional periph-
eral claiming. In his telling, traditional peripheral claiming is
different from the prevailing literalistic approach, which is a
fairly recent creation of the Federal Circuit.1 5 8 The claim lan-
guage marked the furthest extent of the patentee's rights, as
peripheral claiming requires, long before the Federal Circuit
was established in 1982.159 But unlike the modern approach,
once the outermost boundary was identified, a court in the pre-
Federal Circuit era would turn to the specification to determine
whether the inventor's contribution was more limited than the
apparent reach of the claim language. If so, then the patentee's
rights retreated from the outermost boundary to cover only
that narrower contribution. 160
As traditional peripheral claiming requires, the Step Two
analysis takes the claim language as its starting point-in
Mayo, Step Two begins by identifying the three steps reflected
in the words and structure of the claim.1 6 1 And, as in tradi-
tional (but unlike modem, Federal Circuit style) peripheral
claiming, Step Two then adjusts the scope of the claim lan-
guage in light of the inventor's contribution-the Mayo Court's
analysis of the "administering" step is focused on that step's
relationship to what was known in the field before the inven-
tor's work. 162
But Step Two does not comport with a key feature of tradi-
tional peripheral claiming. In traditional peripheral claiming,
the claim's scope can only retreat from the outermost boundary
set by its language. Step Two, however, appears to extend a
claim's scope beyond the reach of its language.
Thus, in Mayo, a traditional peripheral claiming approach
might have limited the claimed invention's first step to particu-
158 See Duffy, supra note 35, at 1201 (arguing that the Federal Circuit has
developed a literalistic approach to claiming distinct from the peripheral approach
"practiced throughout most of the twentieth century").
159 See id. at 1202 ("Peripheral definition ... involves marking out the periph-
ery or boundary of the area covered by the claim and holding as infringements
only such constructions as lie within that area." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS § 4, at 4 (1949))).
160 See id. at 1203 (explaining that the general consensus in the mid-1900s
was that the peripheral claiming approach narrowed claims). While today we
would call this something like a reverse doctrine of equivalents analysis-a (nearly
extinct) defense to infringement in the modern understanding-traditional pe-
ripheral claiming applied it to claim construction in the ordinary course. See id.
at 1205.
161 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79.
162 Note the Court's characterization of the "audience" referred to by the "ad-
ministering" step as a "pre-existing" audience. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78.
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lar modes of "administering" the drug in light of the inventor's
contribution. Suppose at the time the invention was made, the
drug was prescribed on a thrice-daily schedule. Some years
after the patent, the drug began to be prescribed on a once-
daily schedule. A doctor who then prescribed the drug on a
three-pills-a-day regimen would count as "administering," but
a doctor prescribing once-a-day might not because the mode of
prescribing the drug at the time of the invention could contract
the scope of the patent from the outer boundaries set by the
word "administering."
The Mayo Court did not limit the claim in this way. In-
stead, it reasoned that the "administering" step signaled to
doctors that the inventors had discovered something that could
interest them. 16 3 The Court thus read the claim to extend be-
yond doctors who follow particular modes of administering the
drug and to reach all the way to doctors who are simply inter-
ested in the relationship between metabolite levels and drug
efficacy.
Because Step Two can expand the claim scope beyond the
reach of its language, it makes more sense to view Step Two as
reflecting central claiming principles, rather than peripheral
claiming ones, traditional or modern. Still, the claim language
and structure really do matter, more so than they might in a
pure central claiming regime. Step Two might accordingly be
understood as sitting somewhere on the spectrum between
central and peripheral claiming, at a place called "point of nov-
elty." 164 This approach attributes particular significance to the
claim elements that distinguish the inventor's contribution
from what came before.165 So point of novelty takes from pe-
ripheral claiming an emphasis on the claim as written because
the particular claim elements matter, and it takes from central
claiming an emphasis on what the inventor has contributed to
163 See id. ("[Tihe 'administering' step simply refers to the relevant audience,
namely, doctors who treat patients with certain diseases with thiopurine drugs.").
164 Bernard Chao argues that Mayo implicitly applies a point of novelty analy-
sis, in which "courts would first examine the limitation that embodies the point of
novelty to determine whether it describes an unpatentable concept" and, if so,
"then determine whether the other limitations can bring the principle into the
realm of patentable subject matter." See Chao, supra note 10, at 83. Chao thus
appears to read both Step One and Step Two as demanding a point of novelty
approach. As explained in the text, I argue that Mayo (and the other recent
patentable subject cases) require first a central claiming approach to understand
what the claim is directed to, followed by a point of novelty search for some
contribution aside from the ineligible subject matter.
165 See Lemley, supra note 37, at 1263.
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the art because the elements reflecting that contribution mat-
ter more.
The Court's explicit Step Two analyses appear to look for
something in the claim elements that would distinguish them
from the prior art. Mayo concluded that the "administering"
step could not save the claim because it referred to "a pre-
existing audience" and the "determining" step was similarly
unhelpful because it told "doctors to engage in well-under-
stood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by
scientists who work in the field."' 6 6 The focus, then, was on
the "wherein" element, which could not save the claim-even
though that element was concededly novel-because it re-
flected the ineligible subject matter itself. 16 7 This assessment
of the contribution reflected in each element looks much like a
point of novelty analysis. Again, Alice is similar. 168
It may be premature to say that Step Two applies a point of
novelty analysis because none of the Court's recent patentable
subject matter cases explicitly concluded that a patent that
was directed to ineligible subject matter nonetheless incorpo-
rated an inventive concept that would save it from invalidity.
So it is not clear what exactly the Court is looking for at Step
Two. But for now, the most plausible understanding is that the
Court is conducting a point of novelty search for an element
that both cannot be found in the prior art and cannot be under-
stood as reciting the ineligible subject matter itself.
C. Inventions in Context
If the Court is using a central claiming analysis in its eligi-
bility cases, the next question is whether this is desirable. The
Court's approach has some superficial appeal. Eligibility doc-
trine limits the kinds of things that can be patented, not simply
166 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
167 See id. at 78 ("[The 'wherein' clauses simply tell a doctor about the relevant
natural laws, at most adding a suggestion that he should take those laws into
account when treating his patient."); cf. Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents,
and Knowledge Transfer: "The Uneasy Case" of Justice Breyer's Patentable Sub-
ject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REv. 1739, 1777-81 (2016) (arguing that
the mental steps captured by the "wherein" clause should be held as "per se
inherently disclosed" under the inherent anticipation doctrine of 35 U.S.C. § 102).
168 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359-60 (2014). The
Court there reasoned that the claim could not survive Step Two because, "[tlaking
the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each
step of the process is '[p]urely conventional'" and taken "as an ordered combina-
tion," the elements added nothing. Id. at 2359 (emphasis added). So we again see
the Court focusing on particular elements, thereby imbuing the claim language
with some importance, but emphasizing their relationship to the invention's point
of novelty.
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the ways in which inventors try to obtain rights in them; it
therefore seems more appropriately directed at what the inven-
tor actually did than at the words her lawyer used to obtain
rights over her work. 169 Something like this appears to be
driving the Court's concern that eligibility questions not turn
on the "draftsman's art." 170 Central claiming's emphasis on
what the inventor did thus appears more appropriate for pat-
entable subject matter inquiries than does peripheral claim-
ing's emphasis on claim language.
But this masks a deeper complexity. Because courts con-
tinue to answer patent infringement questions using peripheral
claiming approaches, it is not clear why patent eligibility ques-
tions ought to be answered using central claiming ones. That
is, if the actual reach of the claim will be limited on the infringe-
ment analysis to the boundaries set by the words of the claim,
then why should the patentable subject matter analysis turn
on things that lie beyond those boundaries?
The answer begins with the recognition that every inven-
tion is, at some level, an application of a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea.171 The fact that an invention
applies ineligible subject matter, however, cannot be enough
for it to merit patentable subject matter scrutiny. We therefore
need some way to distinguish inventions that have problematic
relationships to ineligible subject matter from inventions that
have unproblematic ones.
The problem is that the claim language itself offers no basis
for discerning the invention's relationship to ineligible subject
169 Cf Duffy, supra note 8, at 645-46 (arguing that the prohibition on patent-
ing abstract ideas properly migrated from a disclosure inquiry to a subject matter
inquiry because "that characterization clearly indicates that the barrier to ob-
taining a patent lies in the nature of the alleged discovery, not simply in the words
chosen by the applicant--or more frequently, by the applicant's attorney-to de-
scribe and disclose it"). Of course, the entire patent document is typically written
by a lawyer. But the specification is designed more generally to explain what the
inventor has done and the claims are designed more specifically to define the
attendant legal rights.
170 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (asserting that "the rule that 'Illaws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable," would be eviscerated
if "the determination of patent eligibility [were to] 'depend simply on the drafts-
man's art'"); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72 (cautioning "against interpreting patent stat-
utes in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art'");
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (rejecting a reading of Section 101 that
"would make the determination of patentable subject matter depend simply on
the draftsman's art").
171 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71; Duffy, supra note 8, at 643 (recognizing that
"inventors' contributions . .. are all grounded in nature's principles").
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matter. 1 7 2 We might therefore worry that all claims could, in
principle, be deemed ineligible. 1 7 3 This worry is well-taken in a
peripheral claiming world, where the claim language is the
near-exclusive guide to the invention.1 74 The claim language is
not designed to describe the relationship between the invention
and the underlying subject matter it applies; instead, the point
of the claim language is to describe how the various parts of the
invention relate to each other.1 7 5  In a peripheral claiming
world, then, the only solution is to abstract away from the
claim language to divine some implicit relationship between the
invention and the underlying subject matter.
But there is no way to know how far we must abstract away
before answering the question of whether the invention is di-
rected to ineligible subject matter. If we started with a claim to
a hammer, we could eventually abstract far enough away that
we would get to F = ma. In a peripheral claiming world, the
words of the claims themselves define the invention, those
words will always be about something other than the ineligible
subject matter, and so it may be impossible to determine when
claims that on their face are more limited than the ineligible
subject matter are nonetheless directed to it in a way that
raises eligibility concerns. This "levels of abstraction" problem
is pervasive in patent law, and has been the source of much
difficulty in subject matter questions in particular.17 6
172 Cf. Golden, supra note 78, at 1080 (pointing to the specificity of the claim
language in Benson to undermine the proposition that the invention in that case
could be an abstract idea in the sense of being nonspecific).
173 See Risch, supra note 95, at 53 (suggesting that the Court's recent applica-
tions of the eligibility doctrine cast doubt on a wide range of inventions that
should be deemed eligible). The Court has been sensitive to these concerns. See
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 ("At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.").
174 Again, "the name of the game is the claim." In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d
1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Rich, supra note 39, at 499).
175 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FYIZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 28-29 (6th ed. 2013) (explaining that the claim "must per-
form two functions: (a) list all the elements of the invention (i.e. the parts and
features of the invention); and (b) describe how they interact" (emphasis omitted)).
176 See Mark R. Carter, Copyright's Hand Abstractions Test for Patent's Section
101 Subject-Matter Eligibility, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 469 (2014) (applying
Judge Hand's levels of abstractions analysis to patentable subject matter
problems); Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels ofAbstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100-01 (2011) (describing the problem of abstracting away
from claim language as a pervasive problem in patent law); cf. Kevin Emerson
Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1279,
1310-14 (2014) (arguing that only some of the abstract ideas branch of eligibility
cases employ a levels of abstraction analysis); Laakmann, supra note 8, at 53-59
(suggesting that patentable subject matter law polices some of the problems
raised by levels of abstraction issues in other patent law doctrines).
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The central claiming perspective reveals a better way: to
distinguish problematic claims from unproblematic ones, we
must understand not simply where the words of the claim lo-
cate the fences of the patent right, but more concretely just
what it was that the inventor (allegedly) gave to society. It is
true that peripheral claiming cannot help us do that. But it is
also true that this is exactly what central claiming is good for.
While the claim language is focused on internal questions re-
garding how the invention works, the specification can help
answer external questions regarding the invention's relation-
ship to the world in which it exists. Because central claiming
looks to the specification to determine the scope of the paten-
tee's rights, it offers some potential insight into the relationship
between the claimed invention and the ineligible subject
matter.
This offers a way out of the levels of abstraction problem.
We do not need to take the claim language and abstract away
until we reach some underlying ineligible subject matter. In-
stead, the central claiming perspective might ask simply
whether the ineligible subject matter comprised part of the
inventor's contribution. In the case of a hammer made by any-
one other than Newton, F = ma would not be part of the inven-
tor's contribution. This approach implies that Newton's
hammer patent will face more serious eligibility obstacles than
hammer patents submitted by others. But, as the next Part
demonstrates, that is an appropriate result in light of the role
that other patentability doctrines-especially novelty and non-
obviousness-would play in ensuring that any given patent
does not provide practical exclusivity over ineligible subject
matter.
The choice between peripheral and central claiming can
also be considered as a species of the long-standing debate
between rules and standards.1 7 7 Rules are relatively bright-
line dictates; standards are more flexible guidelines that antici-
pate subsequent tailoring.1 7 8 Like rules, peripheral claiming
demands large ex ante expenditures on delineating the scope of
appropriate behavior because it requires the patentee to iden-
tify ex ante the complete set of things that the public will be
177 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1778 ("The differences between
central claiming and peripheral claiming bear all the hallmarks of the classic
debate over the relative virtues of rules and standards."). For the near-smallest
possible sampling of the large literature on rules and standards, see Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992);
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAuF. L. REv. 953 (1995).
178 Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1778.
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unable to do without the patentee's permission.' 7 9 Central
claiming, meanwhile, is more akin to a standard because it
demands a case-by-case analysis of the proximity between the
inventor's contribution and some object of inquiry.1s0
In the context of patent eligibility, peripheral claiming ap-
pears to have run into the classic rules problem of underinclu-
siveness.181 Claims will almost never literally encompass
ineligible subject matter. Einstein would not submit a claim
that looked like this: "A law for converting matter to energy
comprising E = mc 2 ." If we took seriously the peripheral claim-
ing mandate that a patent's scope is limited to things falling
inside the boundaries of the claim language, then no (plausible)
patent would raise eligibility concerns because the claims
could always be drafted to keep the ineligible subject matter
itself outside of its boundaries.1 8 2 Something like this might
describe the era between Chakrabarty and Bilski-a peripheral
claiming approach to eligibility led to extreme underinclusive-
ness, such that (pretty much) all claims were deemed
eligible. 183
To remedy the underinclusiveness problem, courts might
conclude that eligibility is implicated whenever ineligible sub-
ject matter relates somehow to the claimed invention, even if
the ineligible subject matter is not itself the claimed invention.
But, again, because all inventions apply ineligible subject mat-
ter in some fashion, all patents would be potentially ineligible.
So on the other side of an underinclusive peripheral claiming
approach to eligibility lies an overinclusive one. Indeed, some
179 See id. at 1779; Fromer, supra note 11, at 757 (arguing that although
peripheral claims delineate a set of objects, rather than a norm of behavior, they
entail the same ex ante delineation costs as ordinary rules).
180 See Fromer, supra note 11, at 759 (noting that central claiming, like stan-
dards generally, reduce ex ante expenditures by "postponing delineation ... until
adjudication"); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional
Claiming, 2013 Wis. L. REv. 905, 911 ("But at base the infringement inquiry in a
central claiming system was a gestalt, case-by-case judgment call.").
181 See Sunstein, supra note 177, at 992-93.
182 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (rejecting the argument "that
post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can trans-
form an unpatentable principle into a patentable process" because a "competent
draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathe-
matical formula"); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 77-78 (2012) (same); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610 (2010)
(same).
183 See Golden, supra note 7, at 1767 (remarking that before Bilski, "highly
expansive views of subject-matter eligibility had such strong support in a two-
decade trend in the case law that one could wonder whether, other than some
requirement of 'human ingenuity,' any truly meaningful limitations on patentable
subject matter remained" (footnote omitted)).
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commentators fear that this is the ultimate destination of the
Court's new direction. 184
The Court's shift to central claiming can therefore be un-
derstood as a response to the underinclusiveness of its past
peripheral claiming approaches and a preemptive response to
potential overinclusiveness. Indeed, the standards-like char-
acter of central claiming is better suited to a nuanced, case-by-
case eligibility inquiry of the kind that the Court appears to be
developing. This is, then, another instance of the regular
evolution from rules to standards and back again.18 5 A rule
frequently becomes a standard when strict application to new
circumstances produces undesirable outcomes, increasing its
apparent error costs; as courts apply the new standard over
time to increasingly familiar circumstances, the newly estab-
lished standard evolves back into a rule because courts see the
possibility of a shortcut that reduces decision costs. The sub-
stantive law of patentable subject matter has also undergone
this evolution over its history.'8 6 We should expect, then, that
the claim interpretation standards will eventually harden again
into rules as the cycle continues.
Although I have alluded to what the Court is doing in the
substantive patentable subject matter analysis itself-aside
from identifying the invention that will be subject to that analy-
sis-I have yet to explicitly explain how that analysis works. It
is to that task that I now turn.
III
RETHINKING PATENTABLE SUBJECT MAITER
The central claiming perspective reveals two distinct
threads in the Court's eligibility jurisprudence. One thread
184 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound* Diagnostics, Nature, and
Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341, 342 (2013) (describing uncer-
tainty regarding diagnostic inventions in the wake of Mayo); Lefstin, supra note
78, at 567-68; Risch, supra note 95, at 53 (expressing concern that the Court's
ahistorical Step Two test "would invalidate patents throughout history and, by
extension, many otherwise meritorious patents today").
185 See Schlag, supra note 27, at 428-29 (noting "the tendency of rules to
evolve or degenerate, depending upon our perspective, into standards, and stan-
dards to evolve or degenerate into rules").
186 See Duffy, supra note 8 (describing the history of failed efforts to craft
eligibility rules and the modest successes with eligibility standards); see also Tun-
Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 Wis. L.
REv. 1353 (categorizing different threads in patentable subject matter jurispru-
dence as examples of rules or standards).
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attempts to filter out claims for which the inventor's descrip-
tion of her contribution does not plausibly distinguish it from
existing knowledge. A second thread attempts to focus patent-
able subject matter scrutiny on a subset of claims-those for
which other doctrines will be ineffective barriers to inventors
obtaining practical exclusivity over laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas. This Part describes those two
threads and evaluates their normative implications, suggesting
that the Court's moves might be justified to the extent that they
conserve judicial and administrative resources.18 7 This sug-
gestion is qualified by several caveats, including the possibility
that judges are not well situated to use the resource-conserva-
tion mechanisms the Court has supplied and the possibility
that inventors will successfully game the screens the Court has
set up.
Of course, the central claiming perspective does not an-
swer every question raised by the Court's eligibility jurispru-
dence. Most pertinently, it does not reveal why laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas should be excluded, or
whether any other categories should be added to the list of
excluded subject matter. As a result, I take here a minimalist
approach to normative eligibility theory. For present purposes,
all that needs to be true is that patentable subject matter law
alms to exclude something like laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas from the domain of the patent
system. It does not matter (much) why those categories are
excluded or precisely how their boundaries are drawn. Be-
cause these fairly minimalist premises seem to be the founda-
tion of the Court's approach, adopting them here is sensible
even if they do not resolve many interesting questions regard-
ing patent law's domain. 8 8
The central claiming perspective also deepens a crucial
mystery: what is an inventive concept under Step Two? The
Court has suggested that its precedent-especially the notori-
ous duo of Flook and Dtehr-sheds light on this question. In
187 It is unclear whether the Court has deliberately or Inadvertently set up
these distinct lines of eligibility jurisprudence. At a minimum, and as explained
infra, the Court appears at least to intuit that the inventions it has considered
raise different kinds of problems. So even if not fully articulated, the Court may
well have the view that eligibility jurisprudence serves multiple masters. That
said, the ambiguity in the claim interpretation approaches indicates that the
Court does not have a completely developed project in mind here.
188 See Strandburg, supra note 78, at 569-70 & n. 18 (describing the Court's
per se exclusion thread that prohibits patents on laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas).
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this Part, I use the central claiming perspective to show that
Flook and Diehr are unhelpful because the difference in those
cases lies at Step One, rather than at Step Two. I close by
suggesting that Myriad may unexpectedly hold the key to the
inventive concept.
A. Implausible Contributions
The first thread in the Court's recent eligibility quartet
aims to filter out claims for which it is implausible to think that
the inventor contributed anything at all. I will describe here
the cases representing this thread, and then explore its norma-
tive foundation.
1. Discerning the Implausible-Contributions Thread
The ultimate goal of the patentable subject matter doctrine
is to ensure that the inventor did the kind of thing that could,
in principle, entitle her to patent protection.' 9 One reason she
might have failed to do so is that she did the kind of thing that
the laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
exclusions are trying to keep out of patent law. 90 But a more
basic reason is that the inventor' 9 ' did nothing at all. While
the specification in such cases describes what looks like an
invention, a commonsense assessment of that description indi-
cates that the inventor is not the one responsible for the under-
lying contribution. That is, the inventor's own description of
her work does not plausibly distinguish it from what society
already knew.
It is easy enough to imagine a case like this. Suppose
someone today submits a specification describing how hard it
is to move heavy objects, and contending that the invention
solves this problem by reducing the friction associated with
forward motion of heavy objects.1 9 2 The claim recites, "A trans-
portation facilitation device including a circular rim; a bearing
in which a hollow cylindrical member is rotatable about a rod
189 See infra section III.B.1.
190 Strandburg, supra note 78, at 582-86 (explaining per se exclusion thread
in patentable subject matter). I discuss this possibility infra text accompanying
notes 215-50.
191 It would be more precise in this instance to refer to the individual as the
applicant (if we are still at the examination stage) or the patentee (if the patent has
already issued) than as the inventor. The point of this thread is that the person
seeking patent protection is exceedingly unlikely to be the person who actually
introduced the invention to society. Still, for the sake of consistency with the
remainder of the textl will refer to the individual as the inventor.
192 Austl. Patent No. AU 2,001,100,012 A4.
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situated within the hollow cylindrical member; and a series of
connecting members connecting the circular rim with the
hollow cylindrical member."1 9 3 So, you know, it's a wheel.
This is, on its face, an implausible contribution. Even
without conducting a search of the prior art, a commonsense
evaluation of the inventor's characterization of her contribution
reveals that she is simply trying to obtain a patent on some-
thing that already exists.
Although not nearly as straightforward as the wheel exam-
ple, something like this appears to be the concern underlying
Bilski and Alice. Those cases are usually viewed as new entries
in the Court's long-troublesome line of abstract ideas cases,1 9 4
but they are better understood as representing the newly-es-
tablished implausible-contributions thread. In Bilsk, the
Court characterized the abstract idea underlying the inventor's
claim as the concept of hedging risk.195 What made this an
abstract idea was not any particular degree of generality or
ephemerality.1 96 Instead, it was the fact that "[hledging is a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce and taught in any introductory finance class."' 9 7
And in Alice, the Court characterized the abstract idea as the
concept of intermediated settlement.' 98 Again, what made this
an abstract idea was not its abstractness but instead its age-
the Court explained that intermediated settlement "is a funda-
mental economic practice long prevalent in our system of com-
merce . . [and] a building block of the modern economy."' 99 In
the Court's view, anyone with at least a passing familiarity with
the financial industry would recognize the commonplace prac-
tices of hedging risk and intermediated settlement. And the
specifications of the patents in Bilski and Alice can be read as
doing no more than describing these commonplace
practices.200
The Court's concern in these cases was therefore not that
the claims were too abstract to be eligible, but rather that the
193 IcL at 5.
194 See supra subpart I.B.
195 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010).
196 See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Usefil Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 57, 60 (2011) (arguing that "Bilski's method for commodities trading was not
'abstract' because it required three specific and concrete steps").
197 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014).
199 Id. at 2350 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200 See U.S. Patent App. No. 08/833,892 (Bilski patent application); U.S. Pat-
ent No. 5,970,479 (Alice patent one); U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 (Alice patent two);
U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375 (Alice patent three).
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inventor did not contribute anything that the world did not
already have. 20 1 When that is apparent on the face of the pat-
ent, the claim might be deemed ineligible because the patentee
herself has been unable to distinguish her contribution from
what was already known.
2. Evaluating the Implausible-Contributions Thread
It is easy enough to see why the claims in Alice and Btlski
are undesirable. If someone other than the patentee has al-
ready produced and disclosed the invention at issue, then
there is no reason to award her the exclusivity that a patent
provides. But the underlying concern-that society will pay the
price of a patent without receiving the benefit of a new inven-
tion-seems to raise concerns more appropriately directed at
novelty and non-obviousness than at eligibility.202 If these are
simply cases in which there is no contribution to the store-
house of knowledge-rather than a contribution of the kind of
knowledge that we want to keep out of the patent system-then
201 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (reasoning that "each step of the [claimed]
process is purely conventional" (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted));
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (noting that the use of "well-known random analysis
techniques" could not save the claims from ineligibility). Of course, there are
other cases in which the inventive act might be the contribution of something so
abstract that the patent system might be deemed an inappropriate mechanism for
protecting the inventor. Indeed, some of the Court's older cases-predating the
Mayo framework-can be understood in this way. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972) (holding unpatentable a claim to an algorithm for con-
verting binary coded decimal numbers into pure binary). The important point for
our purposes is simply that the Court's recent abstract ideas cases represent a
distinct eligibility thread: cases in which the inventor has not contributed any-
thing at all.
202 See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Biski by
Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1686-89
(2010) (arguing that many claims that raise patentable subject matter concerns
also raise other validity concerns and that Bilski in particular likely presented a
claim that could have been held invalid for obviousness). Indeed, Alice and Bilski
seem to go out of their way to conduct eligibility analyses when a novelty or non-
obviousness one would do just fine. Both cases cited evidence of prior art that
would form the foundation for a novelty or non-obviousness inquiry. See Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2356 (first citing Henry C. Emery, Speculation on the Stock and
Produce Exchanges of the United States, 7 STuD. HIST., ECON. & PUB. L. 283,
346-56 (1896); and then citing Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearing-
houses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 406-12 (2013); and then citing
JOHN C. HULL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 103-04 (3d ed. 2012));
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (first citing DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVA-
TIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 75-94 (2008); and then citing CLYDE P. STIcKNEY, ROMAN
L. WEIL, KATHERINE SCHIPPER & JENNIFER FRANCIS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 581-82 (13th ed. 2010); and then citing
STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & BRADFORD D. JORDAN, FUNDAMENTALS
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 743-44 (8th Ed. 2008)).
688
CENTRAL CLAIMING RENAISSANCE
it is hard to understand why patentable subject matter should
do the work.
To the extent that this thread is justified, it may be because
it allows us to avoid engaging in costly assessments of patenta-
bility when it is apparent on the face of the patent that the
claim is doomed. Patent litigation is notoriously expensive. 203
Moreover, patent examination at the PTO is usually cursory, in
part because it would be too costly for any given examiner to
conduct the kind of thorough search for prior art that a novelty
or non-obviousness inquiry requires. 204 As a result, examiners
issue many patents that would fail a validity assessment in
litigation. 20 5 And these patents are not harmless; to the con-
trary, they can be the basis for nuisance settlement demands
and they increase the search costs that the public bears when
seeking information on valuable patents. 206 There is accord-
ingly a place in patent law for doctrines that can quickly weed
out claims that are unlikely to withstand validity tests, without
having to actually conduct those expensive tests themselves.
To rehabilitate Alice and Bilski, we might accordingly view
them as a sort of patent law analogue to civil procedure's
Twiqbal requirement. 2 0 7 For decades, the notice pleading stan-
203 See Gala Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 1443, 1483-86 (2014) (comparing high mean costs of patent litigation to
other kinds of civil litigation and attributing some of that difference to the need for
expert testimony); Greg Reffly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform,
47 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 204-16 (2015) (recognizing that patent litigation is
unusually expensive, but suggesting that the cause is more likely attributable to
remedial issues than technical questions of validity or infringement).
204 See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presump-
tion of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 53-56 (2007) (describing cursory review
necessitated by resource constraints that examiners face).
205 See ld. at 47.
206 See Roger Allen Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus NonInfringement, 99 CORNELL
L. REv. 71, 74 (2013) (suggesting that "invalid patents are arguably the single
biggest problem in modern patent law" because it "is impossible to analyze all
these patents" leading to nuisance settlements). The classic treatments of this
issue are BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 66; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 66; JAFFE &
LERNER, supra note 66.
207 Cf. MARK A. LEMLEY, PETER S. MENELL, ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2016 111-146-47 (2016) (analogizing the cur-
rent approach to eligibility to antitrust law's "quick look" doctrine, which allows
courts "to make a cursory analysis of an alleged violation to determine if it will
harm competition"); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of Patentability, 48
SETON HALL L. REv. 71, 93-97 (2017) (arguing that patent law's eligibility require-
ment has long borrowed from antitrust law's per se rule, but that this reliance is
undesirable because, inter alia, eligibility decisions are often made before claim
construction). Although it is possible to view the implausible-contributions
thread as analogous to antitrust's quick look doctrine, Twiqbal is the better anal-
ogy because the quick look rule is itself the substantive analysis of the alleged
facts, while in both Twlqbal and the Court's eligibility jurisprudence, the plausi-
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dard of Conley v. Gibson2 08 dismissed complaints only when
the plaintiff was unable to allege any set of facts that would
entitle her to relief.209 The Twiqbal requirement-articulated
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 2 10 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 1 1 -
replaced the lax Conley standard with the more stringent re-
quirement that the complaint "state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." 2 12 In other words, while Conley's notice
pleading regime permitted a plaintiff to proceed even on a set of
facts that were exceedingly unlikely to be true, Twiqbal's plau-
sibility pleading demands that the plaintiff allege something
"more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted
unlawfully" before she can enter the courthouse door.2 13 The
motivation for this shift was the Court's view that there are
many cases in which a commonsense initial assessment of the
plaintiffs case can avoid expensive discovery that would ulti-
mately prove fruitless.2 14
We might understand Alice and Bilski as establishing a
similar standard-call it Alisk 2 15 plausibility-and for similar
reasons. The patent system could demand, as a threshold eli-
gibility matter, that an inventor provide a description of her
invention that at least plausibly represents something new.2 1 6
bility analysis asks whether it would be sensible to engage in a substantive analy-
sis of the adequacy of the alleged facts. For a similar argument, see Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 35-36) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=2987289) (arguing that the Court's recent patentable subject matter cases offer a
mechanism for quickly invalidating weak patents). I depart from Gugliuzza in
part by emphasizing this as a thread in the Court's jurisprudence distinct from
the thread represented by Mayo and Myriad.
208 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
209 See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to'Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DuKE L.J. 1, 18 (2010).
210 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
211 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
212 Twomnbly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating that this
requirement is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable").
213 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
214 See id. at 679 (noting that the analysis will ask the "court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense"); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Dis-
covery, 109 MICH. L. REv. 53, 64 (2010) ("The reason why the Supreme Court has
pushed this change [to Twiqbals standard] seems fairly obvious: the Court is
concerned with high discovery costs.").
215 Sorry, not sorry.
216 The Court has characterized eligibility as a threshold inquiry. See Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). It is unclear whether that necessarily
means that eligibility must be considered before other validity issues. See Crouch
& Merges, supra note 202, at 1679-80 (challenging the assumption that the
"lexical priority of § 101 . . . dictates] the order in which validity issues must be
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When the inventor herself cannot articulate a plausible contri-
bution to the art, it is unlikely that it will be worth evaluating
whether her claims satisfy the full panoply of patentability
rules. There are significant savings to be had if we can cheaply
and accurately identify invalid patents at the outset, without
having to conduct costly searches of the prior art or gather
expert testimony regarding the invention. 2 17
That is, however, a big if. The Court's Twiqbal jurispru-
dence has been subject to vigorous critiques. Perhaps the most
devastating attacks concern Twiqbars effects on cases for
which the relevant evidence is usually in the defendant's
hands, and therefore inaccessible to the plaintiff before discov-
ery.2 18 By preventing the plaintiff from even reaching the dis-
covery stage, Twiqbars plausibility pleading requirement may
effectively eviscerate plaintiffs' ability to bring these kinds of
cases.
This critique has much less force in the patent context.
Indeed, the inventor is typically the individual best situated to
access information regarding the differences between her in-
vention and the prior art. After all, the inventor is the one who
has (allegedly) produced the invention, so much of the informa-
tion about it will be uniquely in her possession. And perhaps it
is reasonable also to expect her to know about the prior art she
must distinguish her contribution from, so long as it is the sort
of thing that anyone with a mere passing familiarity with the
field knows about. 2 1 9
addressed"). The argument here is only that we can understand this as a concep-
tual threshold-the inventor has to at least be able to articulate a plausible
version of an invention-and that in some contexts the most efficient ordering of
analyses will begin with this one.
217 See Bernstein, supra note 203, at 1483-86; Lichtman & Lemley, supra
note 204, at 53-56. But see Reilly, supra note 203, at 211-16 (arguing that the
technical issues in patent litigation-claim construction, validity, and infringe-
ment-do not entail particularly significant discovery costs).
218 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and
Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REv. 369, 379 (2016) ("[Ciritics have argued that the plausibility
pleading standard will reduce access to justice for plaintiffs with meritorious
claims, especially in disputes whose alleged wrongdoers control access to the
information necessary to meet the heightened pleading standard."); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1731-35 (2013) (arguing that Twiqbars plausibility plead-
ing standard is "poorly designed to achieve the screening goal it espouses" be-
cause, among other things, it "risks screening meritorious suits" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
219 As the next section makes clear, the ineligible-contributions thread seeks
to identify at Step One claims that need heightened eligibility scrutiny at Step
Two-precisely the opposite of the commonsense assessment that Aliski might
justifiably impose. See infra text accompanying notes 215-50.
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To be sure, if Aliski turns on the kind of prior art that takes
serious digging through technical literatures to find, its plausi-
bility demand will become counterproductive. Indeed, we al-
most surely need a variation of the Step Two analysis-a quick
and easy one-to handle claims in the implausible-contribu-
tions thread different from the variation of Step Two that we
need for the ineligible-contributions thread.220 With this ca-
veat, it does not seem troubling to demand that the inventor
provide a plausible description of what she has added to the art
before the patent system engages in costlier validity assess-
ments-at a minimum, it is easier to justify than the Twiqbal
demand that a plaintiff provide a plausible account of the de-
fendant's wrongdoing when only the defendant has access to
evidence of the wrongdoing.
Another critique of Twiqbal is that it makes too much turn
on the idiosyncrasies of individual judges. 2 2 1 Motions to dis-
miss under Twiqbal require judicial assessment of the likeli-
hood that certain allegations are true before evidence
supporting or refuting them can be presented to the court.
Judges will therefore have to rely on their own subjective evalu-
ations of the allegations in complaints in order to resolve
Twiqbal motions. 222
This critique has greater force in the Aliski context. In
order for Aliski plausibility to be worthwhile, individual judges
and examiners need to be able to relatively accurately assess
whether the specification reveals that the inventor has made
some plausible contribution to the field. But it is unlikely that
any individual judge is sufficiently familiar with the wide range
of technological fields encompassed by issued patents to con-
duct a meaningful plausibility analysis; in unfamiliar areas,
judges will rely on their gut instincts. The question whether a
particular patent survives may then turn on whether the pat-
entee is lucky enough to land a judge that happens to under-
stand the contribution she has made. This would sap patents
220 See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REv.
990, 1023-46 (2013) (arguing that patent examination inappropriately demands
evidence of unpatentability from examiners, and should instead be restructured
to demand more evidence of patentability from patentees).
221 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2009) ("[Tihe Twombly pleading standard requiring plausibility might
be too subjective to yield predictable and consistent results across cases.").
222 See Arthur R. Miller, Simpltfted Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation ofFederal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 286, 335-36 (2013); Spencer, supra note 218, at 1732 ("[P]lausibility
pleading is ... hopelessly subjective.").
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of the certainty inventors need in order to invest in their
inventions. 223
Alice and Bilski may have presented relatively easy cases-
intermediated settlement and commodity price risk hedging
are fairly well-known practices. But they are harder than the
wheel example, and, as others have noted, there were at least
some claims in those cases that may well have represented real
contributions to their respective fields. 2 2 4 Subsequent Federal
Circuit cases have posed still more difficult questions. 225 There
is a serious risk that Aliski plausibility reviews might be pro-
ducing false negatives, rejecting patents that should survive.226
The question whether Aliski filtering is justified would turn in
part on comparing the costs of these mistakes to the adminis-
trative resources saved by conducting plausibility analyses
rather than full-blown novelty and non-obviousness
analyses. 227
In addition to being error-prone, it might be expensive to
use eligibility doctrine to filter out claims covering implausible
contributions. In some cases, perhaps including Alice and Bil-
ski, there are real factual disputes regarding what the patent
asserts the inventor has contributed. And the question of what
the inventor has contributed is fundamentally a claim con-
struction issue. 228 While the ultimate question of claim mean-
ing is one of law, there can be factual questions underlying
223 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977) (proposing that patents ought to be granted early
in the development timeline to encourage subsequent investments in developing
inventions). For modem updates on Kitch's prospect theory, see John F. Duffy,
Rethinking the Prospect Theory ofPatents, 71 U. CHi. L. REv. 439 (2004); F. Scott
Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present
Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 62-66 (2003); Ted Sichelman, Com-
mercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341, 357-61 (2010).
224 See Risch, supra note 196, at 61-62 (arguing that the narrower claims in
Bilski may have provided practical and specific benefits, and that the Court was
wrong to reject "them with no analysis as it did").
225 Compare Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716-17 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (rejecting as ineligible a patent claiming a method for allowing users to
watch content after viewing an advertisement), with DDR Holdings, LLC v. Ho-
tels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a patent claim-
ing a method for creating websites with a uniform look and feel is not directed to
an abstract idea).
226 See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
735, 761-77 (2012) (explaining how the costs of false negatives vary according to
doctrine, industry, and timing).
227 See Gugliuzza, supra note 207, at 39 (noting the risk of decreased accuracy
from using eligibility doctrine to quickly resolve validity questions).
228 The Federal Circuit is therefore incorrect to the extent that it has indicated
that a claim construction analysis need not precede an eligibility analysis. See
Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at 362-63.
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it. 2 2 9 So it may turn out that at least some of the same expen-
sive fact development is required to answer eligibility questions
as is required to answer novelty and non-obviousness ones.230
If so, then Aliski plausibility would not represent much of a
cost savings over simply letting the claim through and assess-
ing it using ordinary novelty and non-obviousness analyses.
Still, there is in principle some room for an appropriately
cabined Aliski plausibility thread. If judges and examiners can
cheaply and reliably use the specification to determine whether
there is even a plausible contribution, then the patent system
might be able to avoid some unnecessarily expensive novelty
and non-obviousness inquiries at an acceptable cost of mis-
taken rejections.
B. Ineligible Contributions
The second thread in the Court's recent eligibility jurispru-
dence aims to closely scrutinize claims for which the inventor's
contribution included the identification of a law of nature, nat-
ural phenomenon, or abstract idea. Again, I will first describe
the cases representing this thread, and then assess its norma-
tive foundation.
1. Discerning the Ineligible-Contributions Thread
On almost any normative theory, patentable subject matter
doctrine should at least prevent the issuance of claims that
would provide exclusivity over laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, or abstract ideas. When some part of the invention bears
a close relationship to such subject matter, eligibility doctrine
might correspondingly apply additional scrutiny. This is the
inventive concept requirement-when a claim raises eligibility
red flags, Step Two's inventive concept demands some addi-
tional material to assuage the concerns of normative eligibility
theory.2 3 '
229 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). The
Court has recently reaffirmed the role of fact development in claim construction.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (holding that
factual determinations made on the basis of extrinsic evidence during claim con-
struction are entitled to clear error review on appeal).
230 See Gugliuzza, supra note 207, at 44-46 (arguing that courts resolving
patent eligibility motions should more carefully scrutinize whether the motions
turn on underlying questions of fact).
231 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77
(2012) (characterizing the Step Two search for an inventive concept as a search for
"additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself").
694 [Vol. 103:645
CENTRAL CLAIMING RENAISSANCE
But there may at times be other ways to prevent claims
that would provide exclusivity over ineligible subject matter.232
In particular, novelty or non-obviousness will reject claims pro-
viding exclusivity over a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea that we already know about.233 The second
thread in the Court's patentable subject matter jurisprudence
attempts to avoid these potentially redundant inquiries-it ap-
pears to use Step One to identify scenarios in which the novelty
or non-obviousness doctrines can satisfy the concerns of nor-
mative eligibility theories, thereby killing two normative birds
with one doctrinal stone.234
This thread is represented by Mayo and Myriad. Both of
those cases involved claims arising from the inventor's identifi-
cation of a previously unknown law of nature or natural phe-
nomenon. In Mayo, the inventors were the first to identify the
metabolite thresholds that correlated with thiopurine efficacy
and toxicity. 2 3 5 Because those thresholds were not known
before the inventors' work, novelty and non-obviousness would
have been ineffective barriers to a claim that provided exclusiv-
ity over the thresholds themselves. As a result, the claim re-
quired the close eligibility scrutiny of Step Two.2 3 6
Although I will have more to say about Myriad momenta-
rily, that case presented a similar scenario. The inventors
there were the first to uncover the location and sequence of
genes responsible for increasing the risk of breast and ovarian
232 See Crouch & Merges, supra note 202, at 1686-89 (explaining that eligibil-
ity inquiries will overlap with other validity inquiries, and that this "doctrinal
overlap is not surprising given that subject matter eligibility overlaps with many of
the other patentability doctrines in both purpose and operation").
233 Cf. Id. at 1688 (suggesting that "claims directed toward naturally occurring
phenomena-unpatentable under § 101-will likely fail the newness require-
ments of §§ 102 and 103(a)").
234 The Court thus appears to be pursuing a version of the ordering approach
proposed by Dennis Crouch and Robert Merges. See id. But while Crouch and
Merges recommend treating eligibility questions "as an exception and delay[ing
their assessment] until after the application passes muster with all other patenta-
bility doctrines," the Court has gone the opposite direction, evaluating first the
eligibility question of which doctrine could most efficiently resolve the overall
validity matter. Id. at 1690. It is also worth noting that this thread does not
appear to consist of the kind of easily-applied eligibility rule that Tun-Jen Chiang
suggests should be applied first-it is very much a flexible standard requiring
nuanced assessment of the patent's scope. See Chiang, supra note 186, at
1376-78.
235 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73-74.
236 See supra pp. 118-19 (describing the Step Two search for an inventive
concept).
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cancer.2 37 So, again, novelty and non-obviousness would have
been ineffective bars to claims providing practical exclusivity
over the genes themselves. Of course, there is a fair amount of
work being done here by the classification of the thresholds as
laws of nature and the genetic sequences as natural phenom-
ena. Still, taking those classifications as given, it seems that
both of these cases are part of the Court's effort to train close
eligibility scrutiny-the search for the inventive concept-on
scenarios in which the inventor herself has contributed the
ineligible subject matter.
None of the Court's recent quartet provides an example of
the other strand in this thread: a scenario in which the claim
has a close relationship to ineligible subject matter that was
well known before the inventor's work. For that, we must turn
to an older case: Diamond v. Diehr.238 The Court has repeat-
edly pointed to Diehr as an example of a claim that satisfied
Step Two's inventive concept requirement. 239 Diehr, however,
is better understood as a Step One case.
The patent in Diehr described "a process for molding raw,
uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products." 240
Pursuant to the process, constant measurements of tempera-
ture inside the rubber mold would be fed into a computer; the
computer would then use the Arrhenius equation-a well-
known formula describing the rate of chemical reactions-to
recalculate the amount of time the mold had to be closed. 24 1
The claim's reliance on the Arrhenius equation, which could be
readily understood as a law of nature, accordingly raised a
subject matter question. 242
237 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2112 (2013).
238 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
239 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358-59 (2014); Mayo,
566 U.S. at 80-82.
240 450 U.S. at 177.
241 Id. at 178-79.
242 Id. at 191 ("We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathemati-
cal formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be
made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract."). The Court's apparent view of the Arrhenius equation as a mathemati-
cal formula and repeated reliance on Benson and Flook suggest that the patent
was suspect under the abstract idea branch of patentable subject matter. Id. at
177, 181, 185-86. But its characterization of Mackay's statement-"[while a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable inven-
tion, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
truth may be"-as taking the Court "a long way toward the correct answer in this
case" suggests that it could also be understood under the law of nature branch.
Id. at 188. Either way, the important point for present purposes is simply that the
inventor's contribution was understood as something other than the ineligible
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But the Court viewed the patent as "drawn to an industrial
process for the molding of rubber products," rather than to the
Arrhenius equation itself.2 4 3 This is most plausibly because
the inventors' contribution to the art "reside[d] in the process of
constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the
mold." 2 4 4 The inventors did not contribute the Arrhenius equa-
tion, which was well known long before the inventors' work. 2 4 5
The Dtehr claims were therefore not directed to ineligible sub-
ject matter under Step One because novelty and non-obvi-
ousness would have been effective barriers against a claim
providing practical exclusivity over the Arrhenius equation.
This is not to say that those doctrines would have invali-
dated the claim. It is only to say that the claim likely could not
have satisfied the novelty and non-obviousness requirements if
it provided practical exclusivity over the Arrhenius equation.
This is because, in order to satisfy those requirements, the
claim would have had to cover something that a skilled artisan
would not have deemed apparent in light of the Arrhenius
equation itself.2 4 6 To the extent that normative eligibility theo-
ries seek to prevent claims that provide practical exclusivity
over ineligible subject matter, the novelty and non-obviousness
doctrines would have been effective vehicles for achieving nor-
mative eligibility goals in Diehr.
2. Evaluating the Ineligible-Contributions Thread
A patent must satisfy several independent doctrinal re-
quirements, each of which is designed to serve a distinct nor-
mative goal. The novelty doctrine, for example, requires that no
prior art reference disclose each and every element of the
claimed invention; this serves the normative goal of ensuring
that the inventor provides something new before society pays
the price of a patent in return. 24 7 Non-obviousness rejects
claims that a skilled artisan, applying her ordinary creativity,
would have deemed obvious in light of the prior art; this test
tries to guarantee that patents are issued only when the incen-
subject matter used in the invention, and was therefore not directed to it in the
way that Mayo views as suspect.
243 Id. at 192-93.
244 Id. at 178.
245 Id. at 177-78 n.2.
246 Id. at 191 ([Ilt may later be determined that the respondents' process is not
deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of
novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103.").
247 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent
Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 931 (2011) ("[Novelty serves to safeguard the public's
right to enjoy what it already possesses.").
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tive they provide leads to the invention. 2 4 8 Utility, meanwhile,
requires that the invention have some minimal practical use;
this serves the normative goal of ensuring that patents are not
issued so early in the innovation lifecycle that it would impede
progress by requiring too many and too costly transactions for
subsequent research and development.2 4 9
Ordinarily, we cannot further the normative goals of one
requirement by applying the doctrinal test of another. For ex-
ample, imagine a scientist synthesizes a new molecule. This
passes the novelty requirement because the molecule had not
existed before. But there is no known use for the molecule,
raising the utility concern that numerous complex transactions
would stand in the way of efforts to investigate the molecule's
capabilities and prepare it for the market. The fact that no
single prior art reference discloses the molecule does not en-
sure that it is sufficiently far along the research and develop-
ment pathway to be an appropriate candidate for a patent.
But this is not always the case. Whether incidentally or
because their normative aims at times overlap, one doctrinal
requirement will occasionally serve the normative goals of an-
other.2 5 0 In these circumstances, we could potentially reduce
administrative costs by testing the invention against the one
requirement that serves both its own normative goals and
those of another.
Complicating this analysis is the fact that patentable sub-
ject matter lacks a firm normative grounding. 25 1 The leading
candidate builds on the idea of preemption. 252 The intuition
248 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
417 (2007); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1614 (2011); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and
the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (1992).
249 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (concluding that a claim to a
product that "either has no known use or is useful only in the sense that it may be
an object of scientific research" fails to satisfy the utility requirement); Michael
Risch, Reinventing Usefudness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1229-30 (describing how
the utility doctrine tries to avoid problems that arise when patents are awarded
too early).
250 See Crouch & Merges, supra note 202, at 1686-89 (describing overlap
among validity doctrines).
251 Anderson, supra note 78, at 281 (noting that "no consensus exists for the
theoretical value" of patentable subject matter doctrine).
252 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (characterizing
preemption as "the concern that drives" the laws of nature, abstract ideas, and
natural phenomena exclusions); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (warning "against upholding patents that claim
processes that too broadly pre-empt the use of a natural law"); id. at 85 ("The
Court has repeatedly emphasized" the "concern that patent law not inhibit further
discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.").
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underlying preemption theory is that a patent covering subject
matter from the prohibited categories "might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it" because
those categories represent "the basic tools of scientific and
technological work." 2 53 In some variations, this is because
many innovations-unknown at the time of the original inven-
tion-will ultimately fall within the scope of the patent on the
original invention.2 54 In other variations, the downstream im-
pacts arise because other inventors will want to develop dis-
tinct technologies that would not fall within the scope of the
original patent, but were nonetheless made possible by virtue
of the technology it covered. 2 55
As Katherine Strandburg explains, however, preemption
theory does not provide a sufficient justification for patentable
subject matter-we need some antecedent theory that identi-
fies the categories of subject matter that should be excluded
from patent law.2 5 6 For present purposes, though, it is enough
that eligibility doctrine be understood as an effort to keep some
content out of the patent system, and that the excluded con-
tent comprises some variation on the laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas triad. 25 7
253 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted); Anderson, supra
note 78, at 282-83. Other normative theories more generally suggest that the
incentives created by some categories of patents are outweighed by their associ-
ated costs; in some variations, this is because the particular category presents
unusually high administrative costs flowing from notice problems associated with
the subject matter, while in other variations the marginal incentive associated
with a patent is especially low because other mechanisms for eliciting innovation
suffice. See Anderson, supra note 78, at 284-86 (describing "innovation-harm"
and "over-reward" theories of patentable subject matter). Finally, deontological
justifications have also been proposed as replacements for or supplements to
these utilitarian theories. See Chiang, supra note 8, at 1873-85.
254 The standard example is the claim at issue in O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62
(1853). Morse's claim was so broad that it would have covered not only the
telegraph but also many other ways of using electromagnetism to communicate;
the telephone and maybe even email would have fallen within its scope. See
Strandburg, supra note 78, at 573-74.
255 The standard example is the claim at issue in Gottschalk v. Bensor, 409
U.S. 63 (1972). Because computers convert numerals from binary-coded decimal
to pure binary in a wide array of procedures, the claim to an algorithm for that
conversion would be useful to almost anyone using computers to generate other
innovations. See Strandburg, supra note 78, at 576-78.
256 See Strandburg, supra note 78, at 586-87.
257 This latter proposition is contested, although it has enough support to
serve its role here. See id. at 591-614 (disentangling conflicts in the cases regard-
ing whether subject matter is per se excludable or excludable only on the grounds
of some kind of preemption principle). For another view, see Timothy R. Holbrook
& Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 973, 976-90 (2015)
(arguing that the excluded categories serve primarily expressive rather than
gatekeeping roles).
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Whatever the precise grounding for patentable subject
matter, novelty and non-obviousness will sometimes reject pat-
ents that normative eligibility theory also tries to keep out.2 5 8
The ineligible-contributions thread appears to be the Court's
effort to avoid redundant assessments of the novelty, non-obvi-
ousness, and eligibility requirements by allocating claims to
novelty and non-obviousness when it appears that those doc-
trines can adequately prevent patents that would provide prac-
tical exclusivity over the ineligible subject matter applied in a
particular claim.
To see how this could work, suppose that an inventor is the
first to discover the neurological causes of Alzheimer's disease.
She then applies for a patent that covers, at least in part, these
neurological mechanisms. This patent raises no normative
novelty or non-obviousness concerns. We did not have this
information before the inventor's work, and the patent incen-
tive was at least partly responsible for motivating the inventor
to obtain and disclose it. This patent should then pass the
novelty and non-obviousness tests because the prior art will
not contain a reference disclosing the causes of Alzheimer's
disease or anything close to it-by hypothesis, the inventor
herself added it to the storehouse of knowledge. 259
Normative eligibility theories, however, assert that at least
some of the subject matter covered by this patent should be
kept out of the patent system because it covers neurological
mechanisms, which are natural phenomena. 260 Because only
the patentable subject matter doctrine could prevent the inven-
tor from obtaining a patent providing her with practical exclu-
sivity over the neurological mechanisms that cause Alzheimer's
disease, this kind of scenario calls for doctrinal eligibility scru-
tiny-no other doctrine will advance normative eligibility
objectives.
Now suppose that an inventor applies for a patent that
would provide her with some degree of exclusivity over E= mc 2 .
Here, the concerns of normative eligibility theories might be
reasonably well served by the novelty and non-obviousness
doctrines. Because Einstein already disclosed this law of na-
258 See Crouch & Merges, supra note 202, at 1686-89 (describing doctrinal
overlaps); Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 598-600,
602-04 (2008) (reviewing cases decided on eligibility grounds that appear as
though they would have reached the same outcome if assessed from a novelty or
non-obviousness perspective).
259 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
417-18 (2007).
260 See Strandburg, supra note 78, at 590.
700 [Vol. 103:645
CENTRAL CLAIMING RENAISSANCE
ture, the patent will not issue unless it covers something that
would not be coextensive with-or that a skilled artisan would
not have viewed as an obvious step from-E = mc 2 itself.
The upshot of these two scenarios is that novelty and non-
obviousness might do a reasonably acceptable job of rejecting
claims that cover ineligible subject matter, but only when the
prior art includes references disclosing that subject matter.
The Court appears to have been using the Step One "directed
to" inquiry to allocate eligibility scrutiny according to this prin-
ciple. Inventions arising from a contribution that includes the
identification of ineligible subject matter are, under Step One,
directed to that subject matter and accordingly get heightened
scrutiny from Step Two. 2 6 1 Inventions relying on well-known
ineligible subject matter are not directed to it-and do not get
heightened Step Two scrutiny-because novelty and non-obvi-
ousness will ensure that such claims do not provide practical
exclusivity over the ineligible subject matter.262
Nevertheless, it is conceptually unsatisfying to say that
some claims would pass a patentable subject matter test-even
though they clearly attempt to cover ineligible content-simply
because novelty and non-obviousness would also reject them.
The reading here of the ineligible-contributions thread sug-
gests that we do not need eligibility doctrine to achieve the
eligibility goal of preventing a patent explicitly claiming E = mc 2
because we could simply rely on novelty and non-obviousness
instead. But because this is exactly and plainly the kind of
thing that eligibility theories want to keep out, it still seems
inappropriate to conclude that such a patent satisfies the pat-
entable subject matter requirement.
Perhaps we can salvage some conceptual coherence by re-
framing Step One as an explicit allocating analysis, assigning
claims to doctrines that will efficiently further normative goals,
and as distinct from the actual patentable subject matter in-
quiry at Step Two. Or perhaps we simply conclude that it is
worth paying the price of conceptual coherence for the savings
in administrative costs. Either way, there is an uneasy fit be-
tween the ineligible-contributions thread and the overt norma-
tive tasks assigned to the various patentability requirements.
Moreover, an effort to allocate claims to doctrines will be
subject to two distinct vulnerabilities. First, an inventor who
261 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
262 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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discovered a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea, might develop an invention applying it, and then, deliber-
ately or otherwise, omit the ineligible subject matter from her
specification. 2 6 3 This is the kind of scenario for which we
would want additional scrutiny from patentable subject matter
doctrine. But because the inventor has obscured the nature of
her contribution, the Step One "directed to" analysis will not
trigger the Step Two "inventive concept" inquiry.
Patent law's enablement doctrine is a perhaps imperfect
safeguard against this kind of evasion. Enablement requires
that the specification explain how to make and use the inven-
tion.2 6 4 This doctrine will make it difficult for an inventor to
obtain a patent when she attempts to avoid patentable subject
matter scrutiny by omitting relevant information from her
specification.
As an example, consider the light bulb. Before Thomas
Edison's work, many other inventors had produced light
bulbs. 2 6 5 They did not work very well. Edison's core insight
was to recognize that filaments-the tiny wires inside in-
candescent bulbs that produce light when electrons run
through them-work better when they are made of high-resis-
tance materials than when they are made of low-resistance
ones. 2 6 6 This principle, which can plausibly be understood as
a law of nature, led Edison to a high-resistance filament de-
rived from bamboo.2 6 7
Before Edison's work, however, William Sawyer and Albon
Man had obtained a patent including a claim to filaments made
"of carbonized fibrous or textile material." 268 By its terms, this
claim probably encompassed Edison's use of bamboo-derived
filaments; bamboo is, after all, a fibrous material. But the
Court invalidated it because the specification did not explain to
a skilled artisan how to choose among the wide range of possi-
263 We could also imagine an invention that depended upon ineligible subject
matter that was as yet unknown. But patentable subject matter analyses can
probably safely ignore these scenarios-if the inventor herself does not know what
law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea makes her invention possible,
it seems unlikely that she will draft a valid patent that limits use of that ineligible
subject matter. See supra text accompanying notes 246-50.
264 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735-37 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (explaining that the make and use standard is not met if the skilled artisan
must engage in undue experimentation).
265 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REv. 709,
722-23 (2012).
266 JL
267 Id_
268 The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 468 (1895).
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ble fibrous materials.2 6 9 That is, the Court demanded that
Sawyer and Man explain the underlying law of nature that
determined whether any given "carbonized fibrous or textile
material" would make a good light bulb filament. While Sawyer
and Man were unaware of the underlying law of nature, the
same idea would apply if they had been aware of it: patentees
will find it difficult to satisfy the enablement requirement for
claims that would provide practical exclusivity over ineligible
subject matter when that subject matter was neither known
before the application nor disclosed in the specification.
The second vulnerability is the mirror image of the first:
rather than omitting information from the specification, an in-
ventor who discovered ineligible subject matter might falsely
attribute its discovery to someone else. Of course, this kind of
subterfuge would be improper because the inventor owes a
duty of candor in her interactions with the Patent and Trade-
mark Office. 2 7 0 But suppose that she tried to do it anyway. For
such a patent, Step One would indicate that novelty or non-
obviousness would prevent the claim from providing practical
exclusivity over the ineligible subject matter. A subsequent
search for a reference disclosing the ineligible subject matter
would, however, come up empty, rendering those doctrines
ineffective.
If this inquiry were restricted to the four corners of the
patent document, this sort of evasion might work. But because
the patentable subject matter inquiry into the relationship be-
tween the claim and the state of existing knowledge is a central
claiming inquiry, resort to extrinsic evidence may again be ap-
propriate as it would be in claim construction generally.2 71
269 Id. at 475-77.
270 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012). Breach of this duty can render the entire patent
unenforceable, although unenforceability now requires a more demanding dem-
onstration of the materiality of the information the applicant withheld or mis-
characterized. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
1293-95 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting the PTO's Rule 56 standard because
it would permit too many claims of inequitable conduct and adopting a but-for
materiality standard instead). The duty of candor might also make omission of
information as part of the other kind of subterfuge improper. But that presents a
slightly more difficult case because applicants generally do not have a duty to
affirmatively search for information, only to be forthcoming with the information
they do have. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
271 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (recog-
nizing the possibility that claim construction disputes might require the resolu-
tion of underlying questions of fact). Indeed, commentators have criticized the
Court's recent jurisprudence for encouraging courts to decide patentable subject
matter questions on motions to dismiss, before there is an opportunity to develop
relevant facts in discovery. See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at 362-63.
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That extrinsic evidence will contradict the inventor's mis-
characterization of what was known. So although inventors
might try to avoid courts' efforts to allocate claims to novelty or
non-obviousness when those doctrines can serve patentable
subject matter goals, the patent system may have effective
tools to police such evasion.
C. The Continuing Mystery of the Inventive Concept
Step Two asks whether the "elements of the claim . . .
contain[ I an inventive concept sufficient to transform" it from a
claim on ineligible subject matter "into a patent-eligible appli-
cation" of that ineligible subject matter. 272 In order to know
what is sufficient to satisfy Step Two, we would need to identify
a claim that was held eligible even though it was directed to
ineligible subject matter at Step One. The central claiming
perspective suggests that we have been looking for that claim
in all the wrong places.
Perhaps because none of its recent quartet explicitly held a
claim eligible under Step Two, the Court has repeatedly sug-
gested that its earlier cases-especially Flook and Diehr-pro-
vide sufficient guidance.2 73 These suggestions have been met
with some skepticism because it is hard to see the difference
between Flook and Diehr, at least if we are looking just to the
claim language.2 7 4 Both inventions described improvements to
industrial processes. The improvements flowed in large part
from formulas that more closely monitored the actual condi-
tions obtaining during those processes. 275 The corresponding
claims-which recited the improved processes without explain-
ing how they differed from preexisting ones-were accordingly
nearly indistinguishable. 2 7 6
But reconsidering Diehr and Flook from a central claiming
perspective reveals that these (admittedly close and tricky)
cases might be distinguished as two strands in the ineligible-
272 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
273 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 80-82
(2012); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357-59.
274 Chao, supra note 10, at 89 ("Flook and Diehr are simply irreconcilable.");
Menell, supra note 9, at 1298 (indicating that Diehr "effectively overrode Flook's
statutory subject matter test").
275 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-79 (1981) (describing the invention
as involving the use of constant temperature monitoring to more precisely deter-
mine how long a piece of uncured rubber will take to cure); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 585-86 (1978) (describing the invention as involving the use of a new
formula to monitor the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons).
276 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 179 n.5; Flook, 437 U.S at 596-97.
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contributions thread: Flook represents a scenario demanding
close eligibility scrutiny because the ineligible subject matter is
new, while Diehr is an example of a claim that might be effec-
tively handled by novelty and non-obviousness instead. In
short, while the Court has understood them as Step Two cases,
and commentators have accordingly struggled to discern a Step
Two difference between them,277 the analysis here instead sug-
gests that Flook and Diehr reached justifiably different out-
comes at Step One.
Start with Flook.2 78 The patent there described a method
for ensuring that a catalytic conversion process operates safely
and efficiently.279 The key difference between this method and
preexisting methods rested in a novel algorithm, developed by
the inventor, for recalculating alarm limits while the catalytic
conversion was underway. 28 0 The alarm limits were thresholds
that, if exceeded, indicated that the conversion process had
gone awry. 28 1 Because the specification revealed that the in-
ventor's contribution included a new "formula for computing
an updated alarm limit," Flook's invention was directed to an
abstract idea-the formula-under Step One. 2 8 2
Contrast Flook's assessment of the inventor's contribution
with that in Diehr. The patent in Diehr described an improved
method of molding rubber.2 8 3 That method required constant
measurements of the temperature inside a rubber mold, which
a computer would use in combination with the Arrhenius equa-
tion to determine when to open the mold. 2 8 4 The inventors'
contribution here did not include the well-known Arrhenius
equation; instead, it was to "constantly measur[e] the actual
temperature inside the mold."2 8 5 Because the inventors did
not add the ineligible subject matter to the storehouse of
277 See Lefstin, supra note 75, at 572-73. For an effort at reconciling Flook
and Diehr in light of the Court's more recent opinions, see Golden, supra note 7, at
1781-94 (suggesting that Flook's warning about conventional elements be read to
mean that unconventional elements constitute inventive concepts sufficient to
pass Step Two, while conventional elements do not necessarily pass Step Two, but
do not necessarily fail it either).
278 437 U.S. at 584.
279 Id. at 585. Although the claim language itself appeared to describe four
steps, the Court began by characterizing the invention as a method that "[in
essence ... consistled] of three steps," evidently collapsing two intermediate steps
in the claim into one. Id.
280 Id. at 585-86.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 585-86, 594-95.
283 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
284 Id.
285 Id. at 178.
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knowledge-Arrhenius did that-the patent was not directed to
it. 28 6 We can therefore reconcile Flook and Diehr by pointing to
whether the ineligible subject matter itself-the formula in
Flook and the Arrhenius equation in Diehr-was known before
the inventors' work.
Still, the majority's understanding of the Diehr inventors'
contribution was not inevitable. A different and also plausible
reading of the Diehr application might have understood the
inventors' contribution to include a novel formula-distinct
from the Arrhenius equation itself-for calculating when to
open the rubber curing mold.2 8 7 This reading would have led
to the conclusion that the patent was directed to ineligible sub-
ject matter under Step One because the inventors' contribution
included something that could be understood as an abstract
idea: the formula.
Indeed, Justice John Paul Stevens-the author of the opin-
ion in Flook-dissented in Diehr precisely because of his disa-
greement regarding which of these plausible readings of the
inventors' contribution to adopt. And he explicitly acknowl-
edged that this disagreement was outcome determinative:
As the Court reads the claims in the Diehr and Lutton patent
application, the inventors' discovery is a method of constantly
measuring the actual temperature inside a rubber molding
press. As I read the claims, their discovery is an improved
method of calculating the time that the mold should remain
closed during the curing process. If the Court's reading of the
claims were correct, I would agree that they disclose patenta-
ble subject matter. On the other hand, if the Court accepted
my reading, I feel confident that the case would be decided
differently. 288
From Justice Stevens's perspective, what the inventors
provided was the formula for "calculating the time that the
mold should remain closed," 289 subject matter that appears
quite close to that in Flook. But, as Justice Stevens acknowl-
edges, the majority viewed the contribution as a "method of
constantly measuring the actual temperature inside a rubber
molding press."29 0 While prior methods of curing rubber per-
haps measured temperature only intermittently, the inventors
here measured it constantly. It was therefore not the Arrhe-
286 Id. at 177-78 & n.2.
287 Id. at 206-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288 Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
289 Id.
290 IC.
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nius equation or even the formula for calculating the time to
open the mold that distinguished the inventors' work from
what came before; instead, it was the frequency of temperature
measurement. 29 1 Taking the Diehr majority's (plausible
though not inevitable) view that the contribution comprised the
constant measurement of temperature, we can reconcile Flook
and Diehr as reaching different outcomes at Step One, not Step
Two. The contribution in Flook included the identification of
ineligible subject matter; the contribution in Diehr did not.
If the Court is wrong to suggest that Diehr provides an
example of an inventive concept, perhaps we should turn to
Myriad.292 After all, Myriad is the only case in the Court's
recent quartet to hold that a claim satisfied the eligibility
requirement.
Still, this is an odd place to turn for Step Two guidance.
Although Myriad was decided one year after Mayo, the Mayo
framework played no overt role in the Court's analysis. 293 And
Alice seemingly furthered the distance between Myriad and
Mayo; as Alice illustrated the continuity of the Court's jurispru-
dence by fitting its precedents within the Mayo framework, it
somehow skipped Myriad-decided just one term prior-in
favor of cases decided decades ago. 2 9 4 We don't have a good
answer for why Myriad ignored Mayo and why Alice, in turn,
ignored Myriad. But if we take seriously Alice's insistence that
the Court's patentable subject matter cases can all be under-
stood within the Mayo framework, then it's worth spending
some time on Myriad.
The case concerned patents that Myriad obtained related
to its research on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.2 95 Women
with certain mutations in these genes have an elevated risk of
291 Id. at 179 ("According to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the
temperature inside the mold," inter alia, was "new in the art.").
292 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
293 Myriad managed to cite Mayo only three times and never for the two-step
subject matter analysis it ostensibly articulated. One cite noted that the Court
granted the petition for certiorari in Myriad, vacated the judgment, and remanded
for reconsideration in light of Mayo. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2114. Another cite was
for the general proposition that Section 101 excludes laws of nature, abstract
ideas, and natural phenomena. Id. at 2116. And the last was in a footnote for the
proposition that concerns about reliance interests regarding PTO determination
are better directed to Congress than the courts. Id. at 2119 n.7; see also Dan L.
Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 505, 506 (2014) (describing "the Court's deafening silence on this
relationship").
294 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357-59 (2014).
295 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2112.
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breast and ovarian cancer.296 One set of claims in Myriad cov-
ered "isolated DNA."2 9 7 Representative claim 1, for example,
recited "isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide."298
Consistent with a central claiming approach, the Court
first turned to the specification to ascertain what the inventor
contributed to the storehouse of knowledge. 299 Before Myriad's
work, "scientists knew that heredity played a role in establish-
ing a woman's risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer,
but they did not know which genes were associated with those
cancers."30 0 "Myriad's principal contribution was uncovering
the precise location and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes within chromosomes 17 and 13."3o1
The question, then, was "whether this renders the genes
patentable." 302 The "this" refers to "Myriad's principal contri-
bution": the "uncovering [of] the precise location and genetic
sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes."30 3 The ineligible
subject matter was "[t]he location and order of the nucleotides,"
which "existed in nature before Myriad found them."30 4 Al-
though not framed in Mayo's terms, the fact that the Court
characterized Myriad's "principal contribution" as "uncovering"
something that "existed in nature" suggests that Myriad's
claims were directed to ineligible subject matter under Step
One.
The Court then concluded that the isolated DNA claims
were ineligible.30 5 Because the claims were "concerned prima-
rily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, not
with the specific chemical composition of a particular mole-
cule," there was nothing new in the isolated DNA claims that
could save them.3 0 6 The isolated DNA claims therefore cannot
be examples of inventive concepts-they were apparently di-
rected to ineligible subject matter under Step One and did not
contain an inventive concept under Step Two.3 0 7
296 Id.
297 Id. at 2113.
298 Id.
299 It was the specification that said that "the location of the gene was un-
known until Myriad found it," and it was also the specification that "indicate[d]
that Myriad found the location" of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Id. at 2117-18.
300 Id. at 2112.
301 Id. at 2116.
302 Id. (emphasis added).
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 2116-19.
306 Id at 2118.
307 John Golden makes a related argument; he suggests that the fact that
Myriad wrote its claims in terms of "their genetic sequences," instead of "specific
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Another set of claims covered complementary DNA
("cDNA"). 30 cDNA is not part of the ordinary cellular process
that starts with DNA in the chromosome and ends with pro-
teins. To make proteins, cells convert DNA in the chromosome,
also known as genomic DNA ("gDNA"), into RNA. 309 RNA is
similar to DNA, but it has a ribose backbone instead of deox-
yribose, and it substitutes DNA's thymine (T) nucleotides with
uracil (U) ones.3 10 gDNA includes both exons-the nucleotides
describing the amino acids that will ultimately comprise the
protein of interest-and introns-the nucleotides that are re-
moved during protein synthesis. 3 11 During the gDNA to RNA
conversion, cells remove the introns; RNA's nucleotide se-
quence therefore mirrors the corresponding gDNA sequence,
but with only the exons remaining.3 12
Because geneticists are sometimes more interested in the
exons than the introns, RNA can be more helpful than gDNA.
But RNA is less stable than DNA, so lab technicians make
synthetic cDNA from the naturally-occurring RNA. 3 13 cDNA is
just like gDNA except it has only exons, not introns and exons
(and, of course, it is not incorporated into the larger gen-
ome). 3 1 4 And although both cDNA and RNA include only ex-
ons, cDNA's nucleotide sequence has thymine (T) where RNA's
would have uracil (U).
The Court ultimately concluded that Myriad's cDNA claims
were eligible.3 15 The challenge of Myriad is to determine
whether the cDNA claims survived because they were not di-
rected to ineligible subject matter at Step One or because, even
though they were directed to ineligible subject matter, they
contained an inventive concept under Step Two. Again, the
Court's analysis was brief and worth quoting in full:
cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as
naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments. As already ex-
plained, creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in
an exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring. Peti-
tioners concede that cDNA differs from natural DNA in that
chemical compositions" indicated to the Court that chemical differences between
the isolated and genornic DNA could not constitute the requisite "inventive act."
See Golden, supra note 7, at 1786.
308 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
309 Id. at 2111-12.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 2111.
312 JCL
313 Id. at 2112.
314 Id. at 2111-12.
315 Id. at 2119.
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the non-coding regions have been removed. They neverthe-
less argue that cDNA is not patent eligible because the nucle-
otide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab
technician. That may be so, but the lab technician unques-
tionably creates something new when cDNA is made. cDNA
retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is dis-
tinct from the DNA from which it was derived. As a result,
cDNA is not a product of nature and is patent eligible under
§ 101, except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no
intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA. In that
situation, a short strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable
from natural DNA. 3 16
As a central claiming perspective reveals, both the isolated
DNA claims and the cDNA claims arose from the inventors'
identification of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences-that is,
Myriad's core contribution was to identify the order of nucleo-
tides that make up BRCA genes as they exist in gDNA. 3 17 Be-
cause all of Myriad's claims arose from its identification of the
BRCA sequences, they are all directed to it under Step One.
The difference between the claims thus lies at Step Two.
The isolated DNA claims recited exactly the nucleotide se-
quence that exists in nature. Because that sequence is itself
ineligible and there was nothing else in the claim, there was no
inventive concept.3 18
In contrast, Myriad's cDNA claims described different se-
quences of nucleotides, ones that do not exist in nature: the
ones that comprise only the BRCA1 and BRCA2 exons. These
were directed to ineligible subject matter under Step One inso-
far as the contribution underlying them-discovering the
BRCA nucleotide sequences-comprised a natural phenome-
non.3 19 But they satisfied Step Two because the specific order
of particular nucleotides described in them cannot be found in
naturally-occurring gDNA. In other words, the cDNA claims
survived because the claim limitations described something
other than the ineligible subject matter itself, and that some-
thing had not existed before the inventors' work.
This is perhaps the crucial difference between Myriad and
Mayo, the two recent cases that represent the ineligible-contri-
butions thread. While the only novelty in the Mayo claims
resided in the ineligible subject matter itself, the novelty in the
Myriad cDNA claims rested in the exons-only sequence of nu-
316 Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, footnotes, and citations omitted).
317 Id. at 2116-17.
318 Id. at 2118.
319 Id. at 2116-17.
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cleotides, which was not itself the ineligible subject matter to
which the claims were directed.
To be sure, the Court could have (and perhaps should
have) reached the opposite conclusion.3 20 Even if the genetic
information encoded in cDNA is not the same as the genetic
information encoded in gDNA, it is probably the same as that
encoded in RNA. The naturally-occurring exons-only RNA se-
quence simply replaces each cDNA thymine with a uracil.
From this view, perhaps the ineligible subject matter to which
the cDNA was directed should have been the RNA correspond-
ing to BRCA gDNA, rather than the BRCA gDNA that the iso-
lated claims were directed to.
But at least the central claiming approach reveals that the
distinction between Myriad's isolated DNA and cDNA claims
must be found in how we understand the thing the inventor
contributed rather than the precise language used in the
claims. 32 1 Because the Court appears to have understood the
inventor's contribution as identifying a specific "sequence of
nucleotides" in gDNA, 322 it was able to distinguish the isolated
DNA claims from the cDNA ones and it was able to distinguish
the cDNA claims from naturally-occurring gDNA (which in-
cludes introns that cDNA does not). 3 2 3 The isolated DNA
claims did not change the genetic information from what was
found in nature; the cDNA claims (plausibly) did. The former
therefore did not contain an inventive concept, while the latter
did.
IV
CENTRAL CLAIMING BEYOND ELIGIBILITY
Three core patent law doctrines-novelty, non-obvi-
ousness, and literal infringement-still proceed along largely
peripheral claiming lines. But the patent system can no longer
320 See Burk, supra note 293, at 508 (arguing that, to the extent that the
isolated DNA claims fell because their "coding information" was Identical to that of
gDNA, the cDNA claims should also have fallen because they "code for exactly the
same gene product as the gDNA").
321 Cf Golden, supra note 7, at 1786-87 (arguing that Myriad indicates that
the inventive concept question "seems largely to be code for the question of
whether there is a 'marked difference' between the claimed invention and ex-
cluded subject matter").
322 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2114.
323 This suggests that we could read the Myriad Court as applying the version
of the "inventive application" test that Jeffrey Lefstin argues Nelson actually
applied, rather than the misunderstanding of that test introduced in Funk Broth-
ers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) and adopted in Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See Lefstin, supra note 78, at 580-87.
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be described as entirely or even predominantly a peripheral
claiming one. Most importantly, central claiming plays a key
role in patentable subject matter, which, after decades of des-
uetude, is now rivaled only by non-obviousness for the title of
most important validity doctrine. 324 As others have noted, cen-
tral claiming is also found in the doctrine of equivalents and in
means-plus-function claiming. 32 5 Several other doctrines-in-
cluding inventorship, inequitable conduct, and contributory
infringement-use a point of novelty approach. 326 It is proba-
bly fairest to say now that the pendulum has swung away from
the near-total peripheral claiming end of the spectrum and is
moving towards the central claiming end.
It therefore makes sense to consider at this point how far
the pendulum should swing. To demonstrate some of the pos-
sibilities, I show here how central claiming approaches might
improve three other problematic areas of patent law: exhaus-
tion, divided infringement, and written description. These ex-
amples should be understood as merely suggestive and
illustrative-a complete exploration of all the patent law issues
that could benefit from central claiming is beyond the scope of
this Article.32 7 The point for now is simply that we have shifted
away from the long-dominant peripheral claiming system, and
there are surely more possibilities in store for the central claim-
ing renaissance.
A. Exhaustion
The exhaustion rule provides that the first sale of a product
embodying the invention terminates the patentee's rights as to
324 See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 94, at 354-85 (describing the "eligibility-
as-king" model).
325 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1772-74; Fromer, supra note 11, at
735-39. While these two areas are not at the fringes of patent law, they are not at
the core either. See Chiang, supra note 176, at 1103 n.28 (characterizing the
doctrine of equivalents as an exception to the literal infringement rule and noting
that the "element-by-element comparison" keeps the doctrine "within the stric-
tures of the claim language").
326 Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro's Commandment Recognizing that Inventions
Have Heart, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183, 1195-96 (2010);
Lemley, supra note 37, at 1261-63.
327 For example, an effort to apply central claiming beyond eligibility would
have to confront the tension it would create with cases that seem to require at
least some aspects of peripheral claiming in the infringement analysis. See
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (con-
cluding that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied on an element-by-ele-
ment basis).
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that product.328 So if I buy a car incorporating many patented
technologies, I can resell it without asking for anyone's permis-
sion.329 The basic intuition is that the patentee can capture
the full value of her invention at the first sale, so her patent
rights should not extend beyond it.sso This rule is easy enough
to understand when the patentee sells the precise product cov-
ered by the patent. But what happens when she sells a product
that incorporates less than all of the elements of the claimed
invention?
The Supreme Court addressed this question in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.33 1 The patentee, LG Elec-
tronics ("LGE"), entered into an agreement permitting Intel to
manufacture computer products. 332 Intel then sold its prod-
ucts to Quanta.3 3 3 Intel's products did not themselves include
all elements of the LGE patents; Quanta, however, combined
them with other non-Intel parts so that they performed all the
elements in the LGE claims.33 4 LGE sued Quanta for infringe-
ment, and Quanta raised an exhaustion defense. The question
was accordingly whether LGE's deal with Intel exhausted LGE's
patent rights with respect to the products Intel sold Quanta,
328 Assuming, of course, that the sale is authorized. Quanta Comput., Inc. v.
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008); see Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegra-
tion ofIntellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary,
62 STAN. L. REv. 455, 505 (2010) ("In its traditional form, the doctrine holds that
the power of the patent is exhausted after its initial unrestricted sale, so that all
future takers of the patented article take free and clear of any patent restriction.").
329 Anyone who owns a patent covering a technology embodied in the car, that
is. I might have to get other people's permission: my wife would be upset if I sold
our car without telling her first.
330 As always, the basic intuition does not resolve the hard questions. Com-
mentators who support a robust exhaustion rule argue that it ensures patent law
does not contravene common law rules limiting restraints on alienation. See
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
DUKE L.J. 1, 114-15 (2004) (describing patent "exhaustion [as] similar to the
prohibition of restraints on alienation"); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 911-14 (2008) (arguing that the roots of patent law's
exhaustion rule lie in skepticism about chattel servitudes). Skeptics suggest that
exhaustion improperly interferes with the efficient contractual arrangements that
sophisticated entities might prefer. See Epstein, supra note 328, at 507-09 (argu-
ing that absent antitrust concerns, patent law should not interfere with restric-
tions on subsequent sales of patented goods). Alternatively, exhaustion might be
better understood as ensuring that patent law-and its particular remedies-do
not interfere with other areas of the law, like ordinary contract and commercial
law. John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law
of Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REv. 1 (2016).
331 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
332 Id. at 623.
333 Id. at 624.
334 Id.
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even though the Intel products did "not fully practice any of the
patents at issue."33 5
The peripheral claiming answer should be simple: no. The
scope of the patent reaches only things that fall within the
boundaries set by the claim language. A product that does not
incorporate each element identified in the claim is simply not
the claimed invention.33 6 Because the Intel products did not
include all the claimed elements, a peripheral claiming per-
spective should conclude that LGE's deal with Intel was not a
sale of the claimed invention, and therefore should not exhaust
LGE's rights.33 7
But the Court did not give this easy peripheral claiming
answer. Instead, it concluded that LGE's patent rights were
exhausted by its deal with Intel for two reasons. First, Intel's
products "substantially embodie[d] the patent[s]" because they
included "[elverything inventive about each patent," missing
only features that were "common and noninventive."3 38 Sec-
ond, Intel's products were only useful as part of the patented
invention.3 3 9 Combined, these conditions suggest that the
Court read the scope of the patent to be implicated by LGE's
sale of a product that reflected its contribution to the store-
house of knowledge-"[elverything inventive about each pat-
ent."340 A product that embodies everything inventive about
the claimed invention is a fairly close approximation to central
claiming's search for the inventor's contribution and, impor-
tantly, is inconsistent with peripheral claiming's reliance on
claim language to define the outermost reach of the patent.
It is possible to read the Court's analysis as a point of
novelty one, rather than a central claiming one.3 4 ' Unlike a
central claiming approach, the Court did not attend closely to
the inventor's description of her contribution in the specifica-
tion. Still, unlike a point of novelty approach, it also did not
appear to pay much attention to the structure of the claim
either.
335 Id.
336 See Lemley, supra note 37, at 1259.
337 Note also that there is an appealing symmetry here. In a peripheral claim-
ing system, the patentee cannot pursue patent remedies when someone sells a
product that incorporates less than all of the claimed elements. Similarly, the
patentee should not lose her ability to pursue patent remedies when she herself
sells that same product.
338 Quanta Comput., 553 U.S. at 633-34.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 See Chao, supra note 326, at 1229-32; Lemley, supra note 37, at 1264.
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To the extent that Quanta leaves open both possibilities,
courts should adopt a more complete central claiming ap-
proach. Exhaustion can be undermined by patentee opportu-
nism, as an analogy to the doctrine of equivalents
demonstrates. That doctrine recognizes that claim language
will leave inevitable loopholes, and it seeks to prevent unscru-
pulous rivals from avoiding liability by making trivial variations
that exploit such loopholes. 342 In much the same way, a paten-
tee could avoid exhaustion by making trivial variations that
exploit inevitable loopholes in claim language. Indeed, the dan-
ger of patentee opportunism is even more severe than that of
rivals' opportunism because the patentee herself is responsible
for drafting the claims. She might, then, build the loopholes in
at the outset to facilitate her subsequent opportunism. And
point of novelty approaches that still insist on some fidelity to
claim structure may be undermined by the patentee's control
over that structure in the first place.
A central claiming approach to the exhaustion trigger
could make such opportunism much more difficult. Central
claiming permits courts to make case-by-case assessments of
the proximity of some object to the inventor's core contribu-
tion.343 When it is clear that the patentee is engaged in the
kind of opportunism described above, courts may more readily
conclude that her patent rights are exhausted; if not, courts
should be more skeptical of exhaustion defenses.
Moreover, the cost of flexible central claiming approaches
is usually understood to be the possibility that the public re-
ceived inadequate notice about the scope of the patent.34 That
cost is probably minimal because, as explained above, periph-
eral claiming has not fared much better on the notice front.3 45
But to the extent that the concern is valid, it is diminished
when we consider the inventor's own activities because the
inventor herself cannot much complain that she was unaware
of the scope of her own patent. Of course, in a central claiming
world, there may be extreme cases in which courts read the
patent so unmoored even from the inventor's contribution that
the patentee can fairly say she could not have anticipated that
her activities would trigger the exhaustion rule. Still, the more
342 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08
(1950).
343 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1782-83; Fromer, supra note 11, at
733.
344 See Fromer, supra note 11, at 761-63.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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ordinary scenarios appear to be well-suited to the flexibility
that central claiming might provide.
B. Divided Infringement
Suppose a patent claims a method incorporating five steps.
A single entity that performs all five of those steps is liable for
direct infringement.3 4 6 Simple enough. Now suppose that one
entity performs the first three steps, and another performs the
last two steps. So all five steps of the claimed method are being
performed, but no single entity is performing all five steps of
the claimed method. This is the divided infringement scena-
rio. 3 47 The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that divided
infringement cannot give rise to direct liability, but it signaled
an interest in revisiting this rule in an appropriate case.3 4 8
And it should.
Divided infringement poses an increasingly important
problem for the patent system.3 49 From the patentee's per-
spective, divided infringement can undermine the patent's
value in much the same way that ordinary direct infringement
does.3 50 The benefits of the invention might be equivalently
enjoyed whether the five steps are being performed by one en-
tity acting alone or two entities acting independently. Indeed,
there may be some inventions that by their nature must be
346 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
347 See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115
(2014); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
348 Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2120. The Court there addressed the narrow ques-
tion whether indirect liability could be imposed without an underlying act of direct
infringement. Id. at 2115. In rejecting that possibility, the Court noted that direct
infringement does not occur when "a method's steps have not all been performed
as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defen-
dant .... " Id. at 2117; see also Michael A. Carrier, Limelight v. Akamai: Limiting
Induced Infi-ingement, 2014 Wis. L. REv. ONLINE 1, 6, http://wisconsinlawreview.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Carrier-WLR-Online-Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BQ5E-SBCM] ("A reevaluation of the Federal Circuit's rule nonetheless
seemed to be an option suggested by the Court's continued reminders that it was
assuming the validity of Muniauction.").
349 See Mark A. Lemley, David O'Brien, Ryan M. Kent, Ashok Ramani & Robert
Van Nest, Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 256 (2005) (noting rise
in patents related to computing networks as driving increased importance of
patents covering multi-user activity); W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Di-
vided Infingement, and Enforcing Interactive Patents, 67 FIA. L. REv. 1961,
1977-81 (2015) (describing internet and personalized medicine inventions that
pose divided infringement problems).
350 See Robinson, supra note 349, at 2015-20 (evaluating various tests for
divided infringement from the perspective of reward theory).
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performed by multiple entities.35 1 So rivals might structure
their activities to avoid liability while at the same time captur-
ing the value of the invention.
From the accused infringers' perspective, however, impos-
ing liability in these scenarios could make her liable for engag-
ing in well-known, routine activity that predated the invention.
Suppose the accused infringer only took the first three steps
precisely because she knew that those three steps were well
known in her field. She did not want whatever improvement
the claimed five-step method offered, at least not at the price
the patentee demanded. But if another entity took the other
two steps, she could be held liable (assuming divided infringe-
ment gave rise to liability) even though she was careful not to
perform the claimed invention. 3 52
Crucially, the patentee did not seek, much less obtain, a
patent covering only the first three steps. And perhaps for good
reason; the first three steps standing alone might have been
commonplace before the inventor's work. The accused in-
fringer is therefore rightly concerned about being at the mercy
of unknown third parties who independently perform the other
two steps, thus exposing her to liability for doing something
over which the patentee obtained no rights.
Some scholars suggest that the problem of divided in-
fringement is illusory, or at least a problem of the patentee's
own making.35 3 On this view, the real source of the problem is
poor claim drafting.3 54 Patentees should simply draft claims so
that all of the steps would be performed by a single entity.3 55 In
351 See Lemley et al., supra note 349, at 258 (asking who could be held liable
when a patent claims an invention "that cannot be performed by one person").
352 See id. at 262 (arguing that imposing liability in divided infringement sce-
narios would undermine indirect infringement's intent requirements); see also
Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV.
72, 116-20 (2012) (arguing that divided infringement doctrine should avoid
catching unwitting members of the public within the liability net); Dmitry
Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. 565,
636-41 (2017) (arguing that tort concepts of causation can be used to distinguish
scenarios where entities should be held liable from those where they should not).
353 See Lemley et al., supra note 349, at 282 (arguing that divided infringe-
ment should not give rise to liability because the problem "can be avoided by
proper patent drafting" and because "infringement Is a strict-liability offense").
35 See id. at 272-73.
355 For example, an invention requiring that a server and a client send and
receive information could be written so that each step is performed by indepen-
dent entities or by a single entity. The former would look something like this: (1)
transmit information to a server; (2) add the transmitted information to a
database of client requests. That claim would require an act taken by a client
("transmit information") and a server (add information to a database). The latter
would look something like this: (1) receive information from a client; (2) add the
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other words, to the extent that claims are drafted in a way that
makes it possible for several independent entities to perform
the steps of a method claim, the solution is to close that loop-
hole by drafting the claims better.
This argument, however, imagines that there is something
special about the particular way in which claims are drafted.
Alternatively, it implicitly suggests that a contrary rule
presents too great a risk of imposing liability on those who are
merely making or selling commonplace components that pre-
dated the invention.3 56
Central claiming, however, rightly rejects both of these
ideas. There is not (too) much that is special about the precise
structure used by the inventor's lawyers to draft the claims;
instead, what matters is what the inventor has contributed.
And there is little risk of imposing liability on those engaged in
ordinary commerce so long as the focus is kept on what the
inventor has given to the world. The divided infringement prob-
lem can therefore be solved more readily by incorporating prag-
matic assessments of the inventor's contribution into the
definition of patent scope.
C. Written Description
Written description requires that the specification disclose
to a skilled artisan that the inventor had possession of the
invention when the patent was filed. 35 7 In the Federal Circuit's
view, the inquiry is designed to ensure that "the inventor actu-
ally invented the invention claimed."35 8 While the doctrine is
not without its defenders,3 59 it has been the target of signifi-
cant criticism.36 0
received information to a database of client requests. Here, all the acts would
have to be taken by the server. See id.
356 See id. at 282.
357 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
358 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
359 See, e.g., Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Require-
ment, 119 YALE L.J. ONLiNE 127, 133-35 (2010), https://www.yalelawjoumal.org/
pdf/867_hcenirop.pdf {https://perma.cc/236X-8TDT] (providing a defense of a
separate written description requirement grounded in principles of statutory
interpretation).
360 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123,
161-63 (2006) (criticizing the modem written description requirement as redun-
dant): Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written
Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH.
U. J.L. & POLY 55, 62-69 (2000) (arguing that the distinct written description
requirement is a historical artifact producing incoherence among modem disclo-
sure requirements); Allen K. Yu, The En Banc Federal Circuit's Written Description
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The critics have a point: written description is an odd re-
quirement in a peripheral claiming regime. If the invention is
whatever the claims say it is, then in what sense would the
inventor have possessed it (or not)?36 1 And the modem articu-
lation of written description fits awkwardly alongside enable-
ment, which requires that the specification teach a skilled
artisan how to make and use the claimed invention. 362 Al-
though the Federal Circuit has held that these are two distinct
requirements,3 6 3 there appears to be substantial overlap be-
tween a disclosure that reveals that the inventor possessed the
invention and a disclosure that teaches someone how to make
and use the invention. 364 Intuitively, it would be difficult for
the patentee to teach a skilled artisan how to make and use an
invention if the patentee had not already made the invention
herself.3 6 5 Scholars have accordingly argued that, in our pe-
ripheral claiming regime, we could safely jettison this redun-
dant version of the written description requirement.3 66
The doctrine might, however, have a meaningfully distinct
role to play in an ascendant central claiming regime. The writ-
ten description requirement traces its origins to the Patent Act
of 1790, which demanded that the specification "not only .. . [1]
distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before
known and used, but also . .. [2] enable a workman or other
person skilled in the art or manufacture, . . . to make, con-
struct, or use the same . . . ."367 The requirement grew out of
Requirement: Time for the Supreme Court to Reverse Again?, 33 CARDoZO L. REV.
895, 900-20 (2012).
361 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1198 (2008) ("[Oince the concepts of
'invention' and 'claim' became essentially synonymous in patent law, the notion of
'possessing the invention' became a logical impossibility except as a rephrasing of
the ultimate legal conclusion.").
362 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735-37 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
363 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345 (holding that Section 112 contains a "written
description requirement separate from an enablement requirement").
364 See Holbrook, supra note 360, at 162; Yu, supra note 360, at 910-11.
365 See Chiang, supra note 176, at 1113 ("Although phrased as two separate
requirements, in practice the enablement and written description requirements
are basically coextensive." (footnote omitted)).
366 See Janis, supra note 360, at 63-464 (arguing that the historical justifica-
tion for a written description requirement "to put the public on notice as to what
the patentee considered to be the protected invention ... does not provide compel-
ling justification for the written description requirement" as applied today); Yu,
supra note 360, at 905-06 (explaining that the "written description requirement of
the late eighteenth century ... served the function that is today served by claims"
and contending that a written description requirement of that kind "descended
into irrelevance").
367 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
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the first demand that the specification "distinguish the inven-
tion" from what was known before.36 8 In the then-prevailing
central claiming regime, this made sense because the scope of
the inventor's rights was set by distinguishing the invention
from the prior state of knowledge. The enablement require-
ment, meanwhile, grew out of the second demand that the
specification "enable" a "person skilled in the art . .. to make,
construct, or use" the invention.36 9 This demand is justified as
part of the patent bargain, by which the patentee discloses
useful information-people working in the field can take ad-
vantage of the patent's disclosure to develop their own inven-
tions, and to build the patented invention once the patent
expires-in exchange for the exclusivity a patent provides.37 0
A resurgence in central claiming offers an opportunity to
rehabilitate the written description requirement. A central
claiming regime demands that the inventor describe the inven-
tion itself (as opposed to describing how to make and use it) to
provide a basis for answering questions regarding the scope of
the patent.3 7 1 Even if we continue to apply a peripheral claim-
ing approach to questions of direct infringement, the patent
system is now using central claiming principles to resolve at
least questions of patentable subject matter, infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, and mean-plus-function
claim scope; it could soon apply them to exhaustion triggers
and divided infringement too.
In order for these areas to work well, we need specifications
that identify the invention and distinguish it from what came
before. That is precisely what the written description was origi-
nally designed to do, and what it ought to be redirected to do
again. This would entail shifting the analysis from whether a
skilled artisan would acknowledge the inventor's possession of
the invention-however "possession" is understood-to
whether the inventor has appropriately distinguished her work
from what came before. A return to written description's origi-
nal role-vestigial in a peripheral claiming system, but crucial
368 Id.; see Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433-34 (1822); Yu, supra
note 360, at 905.
369 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793); see Evans, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 433.
370 Jason Rantanen, The Doctrinal Structure of Patent Law's Enablement Re-
quirement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1680 (2016).
371 See Yu, supra note 360, at 905 (explaining that the written description
requirement at the time Evans was decided had the function that claims do
today-to "clearly delineate what an invention covers"-and that this flowed from
the patent system's use of central claiming at the time).
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in a central claiming one-could solve the problem of the doc-
trine's overlap with enablement and facilitate a more thorough-
going application of central claiming principles.
V
CONCLUSION
This Article's core contribution has been to reveal the
Court's use of central claiming in its patentable subject matter
jurisprudence. This turn to central claiming has probably been
a salutary development-it lays the foundation for a sensible
approach to patent eligibility by mitigating the levels of ab-
straction problem that had plagued peripheral claiming ap-
proaches to eligibility. And viewing the Court's jurisprudence
through a central claiming lens improves our understanding of
the substantive law of patent eligibility, revealing distinct
threads in the cases and casting new light on troublesome
precedent. Finally, taking the Court's use of central claiming
as heralding a more general shift away from peripheral claim-
ing, this Article concluded by exploring additional opportuni-
ties for central claiming in exhaustion, divided infringement,
and written description. While the Court's work on the sub-
stantive eligibility requirement has attracted the most atten-
tion, the central claiming renaissance lurking beneath it may
prove the more lasting influence.
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